1 5th Platoon “Offense” Class 1-06 Advanced CourseKhe Sanh 5th Platoon “Offense” Class 1-06 Advanced Course
2 OVERVIEW Operational Context Organization Strength ArmamentDoctrine of Forces Weather and Terrain Significant Leaders Lessons Learned
3 Overview Key IndividualsRelevance of Events that relate to Marine Corps Doctrine Lessons Learned
5 Goals of the “TET Offensive”OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Goals of the “TET Offensive” Provide an uprising in the south Destroy ARVN’s will to fight Show Americans the war in Vietnam was unwinnable
6 Background of the “TET Offensive”OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Background of the “TET Offensive” January 31, 1968 the “TET Offensive begins More than 80,00 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet-Cong (VC) participate Simultaneously attacks on more than 150 hamlets, district capitals, provincial capitals and other cities
7 Prior to the “TET Offensive”OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Prior to the “TET Offensive” General Vo Nguyen Giap: Giap’s divisions had been battered whenever they met the American forces in conventional combat and the VC was not exactly on the retreat but were in fact being pushed backwards He was aware of the growing US peace movement and of the controversy and division, the war was causing in American society
8 Planning the “TET Offensive”OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Planning the “TET Offensive” General Giap was a major planner of the “TET Offensive” Giap needed a body blow that would break Washington's will to carry on and at the same time would undermine the growing legitimacy of the Saigon Government once and for all
9 Planning the “TET Offensive”OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Planning the “TET Offensive” Giap prepared a bold thrust on two fronts Planned attack on Marine firebase at Khe Sanh At the same time, the NVA planned coordinated attacks on virtually all South Vietnam's major cities and provincial capitals
11 Giaps Goals for Khe Sanh:OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Giaps Goals for Khe Sanh: U.S. forces would suffer small to major defeats This would add up to overall disaster and Khe Sanh would distract the attention of the US commanders while the NVA/VC was preparing for D-day in South Vietnam's cities When this offensive reached its height, it was unlikely that the over-stretched American forces would be able to keep the base from being overrun and Giap would have repeated his triumph of fourteen years before
12 OPERATIONAL CONTEXT Many experts said that the whole siege of Khe Sanh had been a feint to cover preparations for the Tet Offensive in the South Evidence suggested that Giap's moves on Khe Sanh had a more deadly purpose than simply drawing American attentions away from the South at the critical time On January 21,1968 the fighting began at Khe Sanh
13 Operational Context in which the Campaign took placeBeginning of the famed “TET Offensive” Political Surroundings: Giap’s divisions had been battered whenever they met the American forces in conventional combat and the VC was not exactly on the retreat but were in fact being pushed backwards He was aware of the growing US peace movement and of the controversy and division, the war was causing in American society
14 Operational Context in which the Campaign took placeGiap needed a body blow that would break Washington's will to carry on and at the same time would undermine the growing legitimacy of the Saigon Government once and for all NVA was sure that the Americans would tire of the war as the French had before, the longer it took, the stronger the Saigon Government might become
15 Operational Context in which the Campaign took placeOperational Theory: Giap prepared a bold thrust on two fronts. Reminded of the victory at Dien Bien Phu over the French, he planned an attack on the US Marine firebase at Khe Sanh At the same time, the NVA planned coordinated attacks on virtually all South Vietnam's major cities and provincial capitals. If the Americans opted to defend Khe Sanh, they would find themselves stretched to the limit when battles erupted elsewhere throughout the South
16 Operational Context in which the Campaign took placeForced to defend themselves everywhere at once, the. U.S. forces would suffer small to major defeats This would add up to overall disaster and Khe Sanh would distract the attention of the US commanders while the NVA/VC was preparing for D-day in South Vietnam's cities When this offensive reached its height, it was unlikely that the over-stretched American forces would be able to keep the base from being overrun and Giap would have repeated his triumph of fourteen years before
17 Operational Context in which the Campaign took placeMany experts said that the whole siege of Khe Sanh had been a feint to cover preparations for the Tet Offensive in the South Evidence suggested that Giap's moves on Khe Sanh had a more deadly purpose than simply drawing American attentions away from the South at the critical time By the middle of February, it was obvious that the battle for South Vietnam's cities was failing and that US airpower would deny the NVA another Dien Bien Phu Seeing the inevitable, Giap seemed to have begun a slow wind down of the siege before the US counter-attack could begin
18 Operational Context in which the Campaign took placeKhe Sanh Combat Base was located a few miles from the North Vietnamese and Laos Border General Westmoreland was quoted as saying… “The critical importance of the little plateau was immediately apparent… Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for [secret border-crossing] operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.”
19 ORGANIZATION STRENGTHGySgt Lamey
20 ORGANIZATION STRENGTHNorth Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces: 7th Battalion 66th Regiment 304th Division 320th North Vietnamese Army Division (Camp Carroll) 324th North Vietnamese Army Division 2 Regiments of the 325C North Vietnamese Army Division NVA 68th and 164th Artillery Regiments 4th Battalion of the Van An Rocket Artillery Regiment (Dong Ha and Quang Tri City) Vinh Linh Rocket Battery (Dong Ha and Quang Tri City) Total NVA Forces = 40,000
21 ORGANIZATION STRENGTHTotal U.S. Forces = 6000
22 ARMAMENT SSgt DeLeon
23 ARMAMENT NVA: 40 mm Stick Grenade
24 ARMAMENT NVA: SKS 7.62 mm rifle Caliber 7.62mm Length 40.16 inchesWeight 8.8 pounds Range 800 meters
25 ARMAMENT NVA: AK-47 RIFLE Caliber 7.62mm 600 rounds per minuteEffective Range: 300 m Fully Automatic
26 ARMAMENT NVA: CHICOM TYPE-56 RIFLE Caliber 7.62mmFolding bayonet, and metal stock Length: 35 inches long Weight: 10.5 lbs when loaded
27 ARMAMENT NVA: PPSh-41 / KM 50 SMG Caliber 7.62mm Length 33 inchesWeight 8 pounds Muzzle Velocity: 700 fps Effective Range 150 meters
28 ARMAMENT NVA: RPD Machine Gun Caliber 7.62mm Length 1063mmWeight 7.1kg Muzzle Velocity: 700 fps Max Effective Range 800 meters
29 ARMAMENT NVA: TYPE-24 HEAVY MACH GUN Automatic only, 7.62mm250 round fabric belt Effective range 1000m
30 ARMAMENT NVA: 100mm M1944 Gun Soviet Built Dual purposeField & antitank gun 7,628 lbs 30.9 ft long muzzle velocity 900 m/s max range 21000m max rate of fire, 8-10 rounds/minute
31 ARMAMENT NVA: 130mm Gun Soviet Built Towed weapon 19,000 lbs38 ft long muzzle velocity 930-m/s max range is 27,000m max rate of fire 6-7 rounds/minute
32 ARMAMENT NVA: 82mm Mortar Soviet built Smooth bore Muzzle loadedSingle shot High angle of fire weapon 123 lbs fires High-explosive & pyrotechnic rounds effective range 2,200-3,650m max rate of fire 25 rounds/minute
33 ARMAMENT NVA: 120mm Mortar Soviet or Chinese Communist builtSmooth bore Drop or trigger fired Single shot High angle of fire weapon 606 lbs fires High-explosive & pyrotechnic rounds max range 5700m max rate of fire 15 rounds/minute
34 ARMAMENT NVA: 122mm Rocket Soviet Built Four piece Fin stabilized9 ft Long 125 lbs max range 17,000 Launcher & Mount weigh 121 lbs 8.1 ft long
35 ARMAMENT NVA: RPG-7 Grenade Caliber 85mm Weight: 17lb 17 ozMuzzle Velocity: 984 fps Range Moving: 330 yards Range Fixed: 550 yards Armor Penetration: 13 inches
36 ARMAMENT NVA: PT-76 Soviet built 15.4-tonamphibious tank with crew of 3 turret mounted 76mm gun maximum armor thickness of 0.6in Lang Vei, 6 miles from Khe Sanh
37 ARMAMENT US: B-52 Un-refueled combat range in excess of 8,800 milesApproximately 70,000 pounds mixed ordnance -- bombs, mines and missiles 650 miles per hour Approximately 185,000 pounds empty Maximum Takeoff Weight: 488,000 pounds
38 ARMAMENT US: F-4 Phantoms Weights: empty 41,487 lbMax Take-Off Weight 61,795 lb Performance: max speed Mach 2.17 (1,430 mph) Armament: one 20mm M61A1 Vulcan six-barrel cannon with 640 rounds; 16,000 lb of disposable stores
39 ARMAMENT US: A-4 Skyhawk Speed: 664 mph Range:2,000 milesArmament: (2) 20-mm Mark 12 Cannon with 200 rounds each Weight: empty 8400 lbs ;max 22,000 lbs
40 ARMAMENT US: A-6 Intruder Speed:563 knots Range:1,077 miles Armament10 5" Zuni Rocket Pod 28 Mk-20 Rockeye Mk-77 Napalm 13 Mk-83 (1,000 lbs) Crew: 2
42 ARMAMENT US: 106 mm “Ontos” (6) 106 mm recoilless gunsGreek name for “Thing”
43 ARMAMENT US: M-72 LAW Weight: 5 lbs Length: 35 inchesRound: 66 mm rocket Effective to 200 meters Able to penetrate 14 inches of Armor Used as an anti-tank weapon
44 ARMAMENT US: M-16A1 Caliber: 5.56mm Length with Flash Suppressor: 99cmLength of Barrel: 50.8cm Weight Empty(M16Al): 3.18kg Weight Loaded(M16A l with 30 rounds):3.82kg Magazine Capacity: 20 or 30 rounds Muzzle Velocity: 990m /S Maximum Effective Range: 400m Rate of Fire: rpm(cyclic), rpm(automatic) and 45-65rpm (semi~automatic)
45 ARMAMENT US: M-14A1 Caliber: 7.62mm Length Overall: 112cmlength of Barrel: 55.9cm Weight Loaded: 6.6kg Magazine Capacity: 20-rounds Muzzle Velocity: 853m/s Maximum Effective Range: 700m (with bipod), 460m (without bipod) Rate of Fire: rpm (cyclic), 60rpm (automatic), 40rpm (single shot)
46 ARMAMENT US: M-60 Caliber: 7.62mm Length: 1100cmLength of Barrel: 56cm Weight: 10.48kg (with bipod) Type of Feed: link belt Muzzle Velocity: 860m/s Maximum Effective Range (Bipod): 800m Maximum Effective Range (Tripod): 1800m Rate of Fire: 550rpm (cyclic), 200 rpm (automatic) Ammunition: ball, tracer, incendiary and armor piercing
47 ARMAMENT US: M-79 Grenade Launcher 40 mm Grenade Rifled BarrelMuzzle Velocity: 250 fps Accurate Effective Range: 150 meters Maximum Effective Range: 350 meters
48 ARMAMENT US: 81mm Mortars Minimum Range : 83m Maximum Range: 5608mM101A1 105mm Howitzer Weight 1,470kg Maximum range 14,000m
49 ARMAMENT US: M-114 155mm Howitzer Weight: 5,800 kgMax Range: 14,600 meters Crew: 11
50 DOCTRINE OF FORCES GySgt Kash
51
52 MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE During the war the Marines had a maneuver warfare This was used by both the Marines and the Army The Marine Corps was ordered to take up a static defense and was argued by LtGen Krulak because we are an offensive force
53 MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE Defending Khe Sanh presented many new obstaclesRe-supply under bad roads and weather was one We overcame this by strategic airlift
54 MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE Another obstacle was defending various hills around the base The enemy could see our friendlies as well as our artillery positions We overcame this obstacle by setting up satellite bases on the hill tops
55 NVA DOCTRINE The enemy used guerrilla warfare led b General GiapIt was based on small units to conduct ambushes and hit and run techniques This was used throughout the Vietnam War and the French conflict in 1956
56 NVA DOCTRINE They planned for a III phase plan to gain independencePhase I would conduct guerrilla and terrorist operations to control the population Phase II, which was used during Khe Sanh, forces consolidated into regular units to attach government outposts
57 NVA DOCTRINE Phase III, large units would form to establish full military control over an area to allow and encourage the civilian population to ruse up in their support of the revolution During Khe Sanh the NVA began to attack in mass to try and force us out of Vietnam once and for all
58 Doctrine NVA: The NVA/VC did not fight to win and hold territoryAttacks were characterised by adherence to the principle of 'one slow, four quick' - a doctrine which prevailed in both attack and defense
59 Doctrine NVA: SLOW PLAN - steady but low-key logistical build up in forward supply areas, being positioned ahead of the fighting forces to make a solid base for the operation. The degree of planning and preparation necessary to undertake a large operation could take as long as 6 months and often included numerous 'rehearsals'
60 Doctrine NVA: QUICK ADVANCE - a rapid movement forward, up to 40kms in as little as six hours, generally in small and inconspicuous groups to a forward staging area from where the attack would be launched
61 Doctrine NVA: QUICK ATTACK - attacking forces would be concentrated at the weakest point of the target as identified by prior reconnaissance. The duration of an attack could often be measured in minutes and involved; STRONG FIGHT - an attempt to achieve and exploit the element of surprise STRONG ASSAULT - against a pre-arranged position using concentration of force, effort and mass to overwhelm the defense STRONG PURSUIT - the attacking force's reserves would be committed to exploit the breaches in the targets defense so as to deliver a decisive blow
62 Doctrine NVA: QUICK CLEARANCE - attacking force would rapidly re-organize and police the battlefield so as to remove weapons and casualties, it was pre-planned to prevent confusion on the objective QUICK WITHDRAWAL - a quick egress from the battle area to a pre-arranged rendezvous point where the attackers would again break down into smaller groups to continue their dispersal. A successful withdrawal of this kind was calculated to create an aura of doubt over the enemy because of speed of execution and lack of evidence of ever having been in the area
63 Doctrine NVA: Giap, with Ho Chi Minhs’ support, formed a Three-phase plan for gaining independence Phase I Giap’s forces would conduct guerrilla and terrorist operations to control as much of the population as possible
64 Doctrine NVA: Phase II Guerilla forces would consolidate into regular units to attack isolated government outposts Khe Sanh was an example of Phase II
65 Doctrine NVA: Phase IIILarge Units would form to establish full military control over an area allowing and encouraging the civilian population to rise up in support of the revolution
66 Doctrine US: Internal passive defenseExternal plan which included aggressive patrol action beyond the range limits of the enemy weapons The implementation of a sound intelligence reporting system which would provide indications of an attack enhanced the chances of an attack
67 Doctrine US: Placement of sentries, ambushes, listening posts and patrol routes, and their employment on random schedules was used to reduce the Viet Cong ability to conduct surveillance by denying him freedom of entry into the area Done by placing OP’s on the hilltops surrounding the Combat Base
68 Doctrine US: The most reliable method for obtaining early warning of an attack was to establish a restricted area surrounding the installation out to the range of 120mm mortars Aggressive patrolling within the circular "watch" area was aimed at further discouraging Viet Cong mortar attacks Patrolling was generally done at night because the Viet Cong normally moved into his attack positions after dark
69 Doctrine US:
70 WEATHER AND TERRAIN GySgt Greenfield
71 KEY TERRAIN Terrain held vital role in defense of Keh SanhVegetation gave good concealment NVA held most low ground Marines held surrounding hills Hills 471, 552, 558, 689, 861, 881N, 881S, 950, &1015 City of Khe Sanh was lost to NVA NVA had large artillery located on hills in Laos
72 KEY HILLS
73 HILL 881N
74 LZ 861 AND HILL 950
75 WEATHER Base had no controlled roads Re-supply only by air liftNew doctrine on air re-supply Air Drop and non stop drop Could only use smaller planes because of NVA guns Close Air Support (CAS) Base was mainly defended by CAS Bad weather stopped CAS missions
76 WEATHER Enemy would use the darkness to move about and dig trenchesHad trenches within 25 meters of base After weather cleared up Marines called in massive amounts of CAS and bombed (danger close) to base This was a change to the old doctrine Also had major impact on moral of troops
77 Plans, orders, events and decisionsOperation Scotland – Codename given to defending the Khe Sanh Combat Base Operation Niagara – Codename given to the aerial coordination plan to support the Khe Sanh Combat Base Operation Pegasus – Codename given to relief operation at Khe Sanh Combat Base
78 Plans, orders, events and decisionsThe Siege of Khe Sanh lasts approximately 77 days January 19th India Co 3/26 comes under fire on hill 881N from an estimated 25 NVA troops; the NVA withdraws under cover of mortar and artillery fire, while searching the site of an ambush two days prior January 20th India Co 3/26 calls in air and artillery on a NVA battalion dug in on hill 881N, inflicting great damage. A NVA lieutenant is captured and tells of an impending attack. I Company 3/26 is withdrawn to hill 881S and Khe Sanh combat base is put on full alert
79 Plans, orders, events and decisionsJanuary 20th and 21st Kilo Co 3/26 is attacked by an estimated NVA battalion on hill 861, the enemy is repelled January 21st Khe Sanh combat base comes under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket fire. The main ammunition supply point is destroyed in this attack January 22nd Operation Niagara begins to provide air support to Khe Sanh combat base. 1st Battalion 9th Marines arrive at KSCB. Echo Co 2/26 moved from hill 558 to position on ridgeline near hill 861
80 Plans, orders, events and decisionsFebruary through April- Para drops, low-altitude extraction systems, and helicopters are primary means of re-supplying 26th Marine Regiment due to bad weather and heavy enemy fire February 5th Echo 2/26 are attacked by an estimated NVA Battalion in conjunction with heavy shelling of Khe Sanh combat base. Enemy driven out by fierce counter attack February 8th Several hundred refugees air evacuated from Khe Sanh combat base February 10th Marine C-130 hit by enemy fire on approach crashes after landing killing six Marines
81 Plans, orders, events and decisionsFebruary 21st through February 25th Paralleled with the time schedule of Dien Bien Phu, heaviest attacks at Khe Sanh combat base occur with record number of incoming rounds, 1,307 received on 23 February. First appearance of enemy trench system around KSCB February Bravo Co 1/26 patrol ambushed south of Khe Sanh combat base; 23 Marines KIA. Patrol later called the “Ghost Patrol” March 6th USAF C-123 shot down east of runway killing 43 Marines, 4 Airmen, and 1 sailor March US intelligence reports withdrawal of major NVA forces
82 Plans, orders, events and decisionsMarch 22nd and 23rd Heaviest shelling of the month occurs, 1,109 rounds received April 6th /26 and 3/26 push north of combat base April 8th th Marines relieved at Khe Sanh combat base by the Army May 23rd th Marines and supporting units are awarded the Presidential Unit Citation by President L. B. Johnson during a ceremony at the White House June 23rd Khe Sanh combat base is dismantled and abandoned
83 SIGNIFICANT LEADERS SSgt Claiborne
84 North Vietnamese Leader:SIGNIFICANT LEADERS North Vietnamese Leader: Four Star General Vo Nguyen Giap Led Vietnam’s armies from their inception in the 1940s, up to the entrance into Saigon in 1975 Said to have one of the finest military minds of this century considering he was never educated in the Art of War
85 U.S. Significant Leaders:General William Childs Westmoreland Born on 26 March, in Spartanburg County, South Carolina 1963 he became deputy commander of Military Assistance Command in Vietnam After the TET Offensive of 1968 he served as the US Army Chief of Staff General Westmoreland retired from the army in 1972
86 U.S. Significant Leaders:General Robert Everton Cushman Jr. The 25th Commandant Born on December 24, in St. Paul Minnesota. In April 1967, Major General Cushman was ordered to the Republic of Vietnam as the Deputy Commander of I Corps This was the Largest combined unit ever led by a Marine and he was promoted to Lieutenant General in June 1967
87 U.S. Significant Leaders:Major General Rathvon M. Tompkins Commanding General, 3d Marine Division Received the Navy Cross at Siapan in WW II, the Silver Star at Tarawa and the Bronze Star at Guadalcanal Commanded the 5th Marines of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War
88 U.S. Significant Leaders:Colonel David E. Lownds Commanding Officer of 26th Marines and the Khe Sanh Combat Base
89 Relevance of Events that relate to Marine Corps DoctrineJoint Force Air Coordinator Commander – The MAGTF Commander shifted air support to the JFCC, a concept that is still intact today Example: The first Gulf War, Afghanistan, and OIF
90 Relevance of Events that relate to Marine Corps DoctrineB-52 “Arc Light” missions deployed B-52’s 11,000 ft to 20,000 ft above the Base continuously dropping their ordnance every thirty seconds These such “Arc Light” missions came within a radius of 1 km from a safety radius of 3 km due to the ever changing tactics of the enemy (deemed “close support”) Over 400 sorties were flown in March alone
91 Relevance of Events that relate to Marine Corps Doctrine“Super Gaggle” was developed and perfected, throwing the enemy off with the amount of CH-56’s in the air, combined with outgoing artillery and mortar fire Sensors – Otherwise known as the “McNamara Line,” an Electronic Anti-Infiltration Barrier; gave controllers on the ground a fix location on enemy movements to call for air support e.g., Afghanistan
92 Relevance of Events that relate to Marine Corps DoctrineMedia – it was influential due to sway of popular opinion, as the war waged on the popular opinion shifted from favor to disregard It still plays a major factor today
93 LESSONS LEARNED Immediate:The Marines held the firebase at Khe Sanh, but the victory was not favorable for the United States as a whole Tet was not a full-scale shock to the American public, but it was at the very least, an awakening The enemy that President Johnson and his Generals had described as disillusioned and crumbling had shown itself to be very alive and unbeaten
94 LESSONS LEARNED Immediate: 730 Americans Killed in Action2,642 Americans Wounded in Action 7 Americans Missing in Action Un-official estimates place NVA deaths at between 10 and 15,000, some experts feel that estimate is conservative
95 LESSONS LEARNED Long Term:Even though the NVA decisively lost in the siege of Khe Sanh, their defeat turned into an overall victory by shattering the U.S. resolve to continue Expert Military Analysts say that during the Siege there was more tonnage of bombs dropped in support of Khe Sanh, then there was in all of W W II by all Allied Aircraft
96 Deciding the outcome of the WarLESSONS LEARNED Deciding the outcome of the War The Siege of Khe Sanh combined with the entire TET Offensive destroyed the American resolve for Vietnamization In the wake of the serious political defeats combined with the military victories, President Johnson ultimately started the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam
97 SUMMARY Operational Context Organization Strength ArmamentDoctrine of Forces Weather and Terrain Significant Leaders Lessons Learned
98 Summary Key IndividualsRelevance of Events that relate to Marine Corps Doctrine Lessons Learned