1 BY JUDE COCODIA (University of Nottingham)Factors Responsible for Peacekeeping Outcomes: Case Studies of Somalia and Darfur BY JUDE COCODIA (University of Nottingham)
2 Factors Affecting Peacekeeping OutcomesSOURCE INTERACTING THEMES Hq/Bureaucracy Mandate, Funding, Size of Contingent (+ force integrity), International Collaboration, International Political Will, Setting Time Frames, Peacekeeper Training Field/Ground Realities Local Initiative (+ Women Participation), Strategic leadership in the Field and Presence of Lead State, Preference for Impartiality over Neutrality, Domestic Political Climate, Size and Demography of Mission Area
3 International Political WillThis is conceived is the willingness of states to become involved in the conflict management aspects of a crisis despite the potential costs in casualties, monetary expenditures, and domestic public approval (Mays, 2003: 3). One issue which is critical to the early establishment of security and which is ultimately a function of international political will is rapid deployment (Le Roy and Malcorra, 2009: 18). Next and of greater significance is sustaining active involvement. This factor has ensured the success of AMISOM in Somalia, but its dearth in Dafur saw AMIS and then UNAMID struggle with too little success.
4 Contingent Size & CharacterA smaller number of elite soldiers can sometimes handle discreet tasks, the broader problem of stabilizing a country requires significant forces. For such stability operations and difficult missions an intervening force should need an average of five soldiers per 1,000 members of the civilian population (Michael O’Hanlon, 2003). Large contingents are not only necessary to ensure military victories or force the peace in arenas of uncooperative factions, the size of a contingent also enhances its peacekeeping role as a sturdy buffer and provides credibility to peace settlements (Paul Williams, 2010). Large does not necessarily mean more efficient in military terms. If you make a troop contingent with many nations it is much weaker. In some theoretical instances the total is greater than the sum of the parts, the reverse applies with troops. The more contingents you have the weaker it is. You have obviously got difference in language, logistics, fighting method, all sorts of things. (James Ellery, interview 2013).
5 Contingent Size and Character, AMISOM & UNAMIDNo. of Troops UNAMID Troop Contributing Countries 3,300 – 3,000 Rwanda 3,000 – 2,700 2,700 – 2,400 Ethiopia, Nigeria 2,400 -2,100 2,100 – 1,800 1,800 – 1,500 1,500 – 1,200 1, Egypt 900 – 600 Burkina Faso, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania 600 – 300 Nepal, Pakistan 300 – 1 Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Cambodia, China, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Palau, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Thailand, Togo, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe. No. of Troops AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries 6,233 Uganda 5,432 Burundi 4,395 Ethiopia 3,664 Kenya 960 Djibouti 850 Sierra Leone
6 Local Participation Local population support is the centre of gravity in any peacekeeping operation (Wilson Mendes Lauria, 2009). Attaining peace through local capacity initiative is still considered the most viable for the social and infrastructural reconstruction of society (Beverly Metcalfe, 2010; Séverine Autesserre, 2014 ). Pivotal factors for the success and sustenance of post-conflict development is the development of women (Aning and Edu-Afful, 2013). If the goal is to improve health, nutrition or education, build robust and self sustaining community organisations, encourage grass-roots democracy, and ultimately, temper extremism, successful efforts must target women (Isobel Coleman, 2004). AMISOM has succeeded in involving Somalis in the peace. The Government of Sudan and violence has prevented same from being harnessed in Darfur by UNAMID.
7 Domestic Political Elite CooperationWhen local political actors live up to their responsibilities and lead by example, it reinforces the incentives for the people to cooperate (Arce, 2001). Any attempt to improve peacekeeping will not matter if a country’s leaders and resources conspire against peace. What mars and affects peacekeeping the most are the power struggles within a country which puts barriers to its impacting positively (Jett, 2001; Durant and Weintraub, 2014). Local elite opposition has undermined the efforts of UNAMID in Darfur. Its support has contributed to general acceptance and success of AMISOM in Somalia.
8 CONCLUSION AND POINT OF NOTEThe four factors discussed in greater detail are most crucial for peacekeeping’s effectiveness irrespective of the scope, intensity or duration of the operation. On the factors of mandate and funding which are generally conceived as being at the heart of peace operations success, this presentation contends that the more intense and complex a peace operation, the greater the necessity of these factors for success.