1 Heaven or Hell: Interest Representation and Pluralist DemocracyDavid Lowery Bruce R. Miller & Dean D. LaVigne Professor Department of Political Science Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA 16802 Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, October 20-21, 2016.
2 Outline of the Sales PitchThe Big Question We Have Avoided Public Opinion Research on the Question Interest Group Research on the Question Developing a Truly Macro-Level Interest Representation Research Program Conclusion: Advantages of the Research Program
3 I. The Unanswered Question: Pluralist Heaven or Hell?
4 I. Heaven or Hell Question is about DemocracyRobert Dahl’s 5 Elements of an Ideal Democracy1 Equality of Voting Effective Participation Enlightened Understanding Final Control Over the Agenda: “The body of citizens should have the exclusive authority over what matters are or are not to be decided by means of processes that satisfy the first three criteria.”…and by implication, the substantive congruence of opinion and policy. Inclusion Questions for Us: How does Interest Representation Influence Criterions 1, 2, 3, especially 4, and perhaps 5? With respect to Criterion 4: How do interest systems perturb agenda- opinion congruence and policy-opinion congruence? Robert Dahl Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy. Yale University Press: 6.
5 II. Public Opinion Answers: The Rational PublicStandard Criterion in Most Public Opinion-Policy Congruence Studies: Micro-Level Dyadic Representation Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro The Rational Public. University of Chicago Press. The Problems with the Rational Dyadic Representation Standard Assumptions about Citizens’ Preferences Burkean Representation: Great Recession Bailouts Problems of Aggregation and Inferential Validity Problems of Selection Bias and Generalizability Specification Error: Interest Organizations?
6 II: Public Opinion Answers: Critics of DemocracyRecent Meso-Level Public Opinion Critics of Democracy vis-à-vis Economic Inequality Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson Winner Take All Politics. Simon and Schuster. Larry Bartels Unequal Democracy. Princeton University Press. Martin Gilens Affluence and Influence. Princeton University Press. Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels Democracy for Realists. Princeton University Press.
7 II. The Villains in the CritiquesThe Conversian Critique of Voters: All Four The Myopic Economic Voting Critique of Voters: Bartels The Identity Politics Critique of Parties: Achen & Bartels The Schattschneiderian Critique of Interest Organizations The Key Mechanism of Elite Influence in All four Evidence of Interest Group Influence Assumption & Anecdote! Bartel’s Estate Tax Analysis Bartels: General Campaign Finance Contributions Gilens: Balance of 40 Most Influential Interest Groups
8 II. Problems w/ Critical Opinion-Policy ResearchSpecification Error Most Democracy Critiques Simply Lack IG Measures Measurement Error Where IGs Measured, Measured Poorly/Null Results Inferential Validity: Dyadic Representation Versus Macro Polity Representation Selection Bias Solely Focus on Hot Button Issue Solely Focus on Issues with Specific Opinion Data
9 II. Public Opinion Answers: The Macro Polity ApproachRelaxed Standards for Policy-Opinion Congruence General Measures of Opinion Mood & Policy Liberalism Less Stringent Demands on Voters “People are not expected to have clearly defined and well-reasoned positions on various issues. People are not expected to be fully informed about the actions of policymakers. All people are not expected to respond. All that is required is that some meaningful portion of citizens have a basic preference for policy change.” Stuart Soroka and Christopher Wlezien Degrees of Democracy. Cambridge University Press: Temporal Expectations about Opinion-Policy Congruence “One of the more basic beliefs of nearly all observers of politics is that citizens want government not only to succeed, in an objective sense, but to do so along a path that honors the citizen’s beliefs and values.” (Erikson, McKuen, Stimson, The Macro Polity. Cambridge university Press: 14. Specification Error: No Interest Organizations!
10 III. IG Research: Partial Models / Mixed ResultsMost Influence Studies Lack Opinion Data Andreas Dur, Patrick Berhagen, and David Marshall “Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?” Comparative Political Studies. 48 (8): Studies of Single Policies w/ Opinion Data Virginia Gray, David Lowery, Erik K. Godwin, and James Monogan “Incrementing Toward Nowhere: Universal Health Care Coverage in the States.” Publius. 40 (January): Virginia Gray, David Lowery, and Eric Godwin “The Political Management of Managed Care: Explaining Variations in State HMO Regulations.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law. 32 (3): Virginia Gray, David Lowery, and Eric Godwin “Public Preferences and Organized Interests in Health Policy: State Pharmacy Assistance Programs as Innovations.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law. 32 (1):
11 III. IG Results: Partial Models / Mixed ResultsStudies of Multiple Salient Policies w/ Opinion Data Virginia Gray, David Lowery, Matthew Fellowes, and Jennifer Anderson, “Understanding the Demand-Side of Lobbying: Interest System Energy in the American States.” American Politics Research. 33 (1): Anne Rasmussen, Lars Mader, and Stefanie Reher ”With a Little Help from their Friends? The Roles of Public Opinion in Advocacy Success.” Currently Under Review. Studies of Populations of Policies w/ Opinion Data William Jacoby, Sandra Schneider, Virginia Gray, and David Lowery “Interest Groups, Public Opinion, and State Policy Priorities.” Currently Under Review.
12 III. Problems in IG Heaven & Hell ResearchSpecification Error Most Influence Studies Lack Opinion Measures Other Studies Lack Larger Model of Congruence Measurement Validity Mix of Specific & General Opinion Measures Inferential Validity Single or Few Policy Results: Mixed and Non-Cumulative Aggregate Opinion/Policy: Reverse Causality Selection Bias Hot Button Issues: Generalizability
13 IV. The Basic Macro Polity ModelThe Starting Point: The Macro Polity Model Robert Erikson, Michael McKeun, and James Stimpson The Macro Polity. Cambridge University Press. Stuart Soroka and Chistopher Wlezien Degrees of Democracy. Cambridge University Press. The EMS Time Series Model: Two Equation System Policy Liberalismt = a(Policyt-1) + b(Electionst-1) + g(Opiniont-1) + et Electionst-1 = p(Opiniont-1) + et-1 Two Key Traits of Model Comprehensive or General Indicators of Opinion & Policy Dynamic Nature of the Model: Thermostatic Covariance Over Time
14 IV. The Extended Macro Polity ModelSpecification Error in the Macro Policy Model: No Interests! “Our analysis of the macro policy – rather than specific policies – captures the ideological majoritarian parts of political life but misses the daily infighting of interest group politics. Much of what happens in government, well-appreciated by the K Street crowd, occurs below the radar range of ideological politics.” (EMS: 437) A Revised EMS Time Series Model Policy Liberalismt = a(Policyt-1) + b(Electionst-1) + g(Opiniont-1) f(IGDensityt) + h(IGDiversityt) l(Opiniont-1*IGDensityt) + z(Opiniont-1*IGDensityt) + et Electionst-1 = p(Opiniont-1) +j(IGDensityt-1) k(IGDiversityt-1) l(Opiniont-1*IGDensityt-1) + z(Opiniont-1*IGDensityt-1) + et-1
15 IV. Assessing the Extended Macro Polity ModelTheoretical Expectations of Extended Model Direct Impact of IG System Traits on Policy and Elections Interactive Effects of IG System on Opinion Impact on Policy and Elections Impact of Both on Amplitude of Thermostatic Dynamics Impact of Both on Speed of Thermostatic Pulse Response Impact on Both on Dispersion of Thermostatic Responses Relationship of Hypothesis to Heaven or Hell Question Indications of Heaven Indications of Hell
16 IV. Testing the Extended Macro Polity Research ProgramIndependent Variables Opinion Liberalism: Opinion Liberalism or Mood Elections & Party Control Interest Group System Density & Diversity Dependent Variables: Agendas & Policy Policy Agendas: Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University of Chicago. Public Budgets: Christopher Wlezien “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending.” American Journal of Political Science. 39:
17 V. Conclusion The Relationship Between this Research Program and our Conventional Work on Interest Organization Influence A Different Question…an Important Question…an Interesting Question It Raises New Ways in which Interest Organizations Might Matter that Cannot be or are Hard to Assess by Looking at Single Issues More Plausible Standard of Policy Congruence and Controls for Reverse Causality Due to Demand Theory of Lobbying It Links Interest Organization Research to Larger Research Programs on Democratic Politics Getting Someone Else to Do the Work This research program is for you!