1 International Politics of Turkey Şuhnaz Yılmaz Koç University, IstanbulSpring, 2014

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9 Three Stages of Turkish Foreign Policy in the post-WWII eraA passive or reactive foreign policy during the Cold War period The first wave of foreign policy activism in the immediate post-Cold War context (1990s) A second wave of foreign policy activism in the 2000s during the AKP era and a shift towards becoming a more benign regional power.

10 Turkey: General Facts Population 74.00 Million GDP (Current US $)$789.3 billion GDP Growth 4.3 % (2013) Current Account Balance -7.4% (2013) GNI per capita $ Life Expectancy 74.2 HDI Rank/ Index 90 / 0.722 Human Development Index Trends Present Sources: World Bank and Human Development Index,

11 The First Wave of FP Activism (1990s)

12 The First Wave of FP Activism (1990s)The start of the activism with the Özal’s “new vision” for foreign policy, targeting to make Turkey a decisive regional power. Four dimensions:  promoting close ties and significant FP alignment with the US in the Balkans and the Middle East (Significance of Turkey-US-Israel Triangle)  aiming to make Turkey the only Muslim member of the “European Club”  envisioning a renewed emphasis on the relations with the Middle East in economic and political terms  projecting an image of Turkey as the leader of the Turkic peoples of the former Soviet Union by forming extensive ties with the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus

13 The First Wave of FP Activism (1990s)Major policies during this phase of FP activism:  pushing for EU membership first by accepting the reactivation of the Customs Union Project at the end of and then striving for full accession to the EU resulting in Turkish candidacy for full membership at the Helsinki Summit  developing close relations with Russia and the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia, by making the Eurasian region one of the central targets of FP efforts of the 1990s (a proactive role in the foundation of BSEC, improved economic relations with Russia, active engagement with the “Turkic Republics of Central Asia”, the BTC Oil Pipeline Project)

14 The First Wave of FP Activism (1990s) FP activism in the Balkans in the form of supporting the Bosnians in their struggle against the Serbs, but with a multilateralist approach and FP alignment with the US (also substantial participation in the peace keeping operations in the region – Bosnia and Kosovo)  Middle East constituted the weak link in this foreign policy activism despite the fact that the Welfare Party, a key political actor of the 1990s , was clearly interested in forging close links with the Arab Middle East and the Islamic World in general (Erbakan’s Libya visit, the idea of an Islamic G-8)  Significance of Turkey-US-Israel Triangle (1996 agreement with Israel)

15 The Second Wave of FP Activism: The AKP Era (After 2002)

16 A Shift Towards Becoming a Benign Regional Power:The Second Wave of FP Activism-The AKP Era (After 2002) An emerging FP understanding based more on the notions of “benign regional power” and “good neighborly relations”. (“zero problems with all neighbors” approach and deviation from traditional FP positions like the one in Cyprus and Northern Iraq)… A multi-dimensional approach to foreign policy inspired by Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “Strategic Depth” perspective. Foreign policy is perceived no longer as a series of bilateral relations or foreign policy moves, but as a series of mutually reinforcing and interlocking processes. (historical, geopolitical, geo-cultural, geo-economic factors).

17 A Shift Towards Becoming a Benign Regional Power:The Second Wave of FP Activism-The AKP Era (After 2002) More consistent and vigorous Europeanization process especially between Nov and the end of 2005 with intensive democratization and extension of civil rights. A much more pro-active approach towards the Middle East in the form of seeking to forge friendly relations with the Arab world. The emerging rapprochement between Turkey and the Arab countries. (Turkey’s assuming a leadership role in the Islamic Conference Organization; the positive impact of March 1 decision, improved relations with Syria). A strong but at the same more pragmatic drive to develop diplomatic and economic relations with Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union. (attempts to revive the BSEC project, struggle to further the role of Turkey as an important energy corridor).

18 The Second Wave of FP Activism The AKP Era (After 2002)Turkey’s role as a bridge between the Christian and the Islamic worlds and as a facilitator of inter-cultural dialogue at a time of rising tensions and Islamophobia (The Dialogue of Civilizations Initiative). Strong relations with the US until March 2003 with the US playing a key role in Turkey’s post economic crisis recovery process and in Turkey’s drive towards EU membership. (relatively weaker relations between March and the second half of 2007).

19 2) Continuity and Change in the Turkish FP from the First to the Second Wave of FP activismElements of continuity: There exist considerable amounts of continuity in the Turkish foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold War and the AKP eras. There is not a complete rupture in the Turkish FP with the AKP government, ruling since Nov  In both periods, the Europeanization and the Eurasian elements co-exist in Turkish FP. The shift from Europeanization to Euro-asianism seems to occur in periods of disappointment towards the EU and weakening of the relations with the Union.

20 2) Continuity and Change in the Turkish FP from the First to the Second Wave of FP activismElements of Change:  The approach of a “benign regional power” based on the use of soft power resources in the AKP era, instead of the elements of a “coercive regional power” of the 1990s.  A more pragmatic FP in the AKP era, compared to the more identity-based and emotionally-charged Turkish FP during the 1990s. (example: Improved relations with Armenia).  Distancing from the Turkey-US-Israel triangle of the 1990s.

21 2) Continuity and Change in the Turkish FP from the First to the Second Wave of FP activismElements of Change (cont.)  In the AKP era, an attempt is made to exploit inter-linkages between different dimensions of foreign policy. Turkey’s mediating role in various conflict situations becomes increasingly important enhancing its status as a pivotal regional power. (example: Pakistan-Israel and Israeli-Palestinian relations)  Much stronger economy in the AKP era and its impact on Turkish FP. The 1990s style foreign policy activism had been hampered by the chronic instability of the Turkish economy and recurrent financial crises.  In the new era, single-digit inflation, significant amounts of economic growth, the significant trade and investment linkages forged, the growing maturity and internationalization of Turkish private capital all helped Turkey to pursue a more active and effective foreign policy.

22 3) The AKP Era: Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive, Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”The AKP Era can be divided into two sub-phases: 1) From the end of 2002 to the end of 2005: the Golden Age of Europeanization in Turkey. (substantial efforts for full membership, economic and political reforms). 2) During 2006 and 2007: continuity in terms of foreign policy activism with the previous sub-phase, but loss of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the EU membership policy.  “Indeed, we may go further and argue that the foreign policy stance of the AKP government in the post-2005 era deviated from an all out Europeanization drive to a possible retreat to what could be described as a kind of soft Euroasianism”.

23 3) The AKP Era: Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive, Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism”The reasons behind this shift from Europeanization to “Soft Euro- Asianism”:  The intense debate in Europe, including the major European countries like France and Germany, scrutinizing Turkey’s full EU membership prospects  The EU’s own domestic crises such as its constitutional stalemate and the recent economic crisis.  Some of the key EU decisions concerning the Turkey’s membership to the Union such as the possibility of permanent safeguards on full labor mobility  Failure of the EU to fulfill its promises to the Turkish Cypriots in return for their cooperative attitude during the Annan initiative of

24 3) The AKP Era: Loss of Momentum of the Europeanization Drive, Retreat to “Soft Euro-Asianism” There are also two major domestic factors in explaining the retreat in Europeanization towards a “Euro-Asianism” 1.The AKP’s increasing political power in Turkey decreased its need for an external safeguard as the EU in shaping civil- military relations. 2.The relatively good performance of Turkish economy, which led to a certain de-linking of the economy from the issue of full EU membership (more powerful and stable economy meant less need for EU anchor for the future of Turkish economy)

25 4) Turkey’s Current Foreign Policy DynamicsTurkish-American Relations Turkey and the European Union Turkey and the Middle East Geopolitics of the Caspian Basin and Energy Politics

26 Turkey-US Relations after the Cold WarChanges in the International Context of the Relations  the end of the Cold War and the resulting termination of the global strategic rivalry between the US and USSR (new role for NATO)  the end of perceived threat from the Soviet Union  the transformation of political landscape of Eurasia and Balkans (new states, new neighbors etc.)

27 Turkey-US Relations after the Cold WarIssues of Convergence in TR-US relations 1) Turkey’s strategic interest for the US continued (being a key member of NATO, having the potential to influence military, political and economic developments in its region – the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, etc.) 2) Regional security problems dominating the agendas of both the US and Turkey - the eruption of armed conflicts and political violence near TR’s borders in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus - the Gulf War following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990* - the eruption of ethno-national/secessionist conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya

28 Turkey-US Relations after the Cold WarIssues of Convergence in TR-US relations 3) Turkey’s efforts to pursue a new activist and assertive FP in the Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus and the Central Asia - new areas of potential Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia after the collapse of USSR - greater room of maneuver for TR in the Middle East - the decline in the strengths of the TR’s traditional rivals such as Russia, Syria and Iraq - the desire to reassert the TR’s strategic importance for the West, particularly to the US - Greek-Turkish Rapprochement *Policy Convergence in the Middle East: Gulf War of Strong support by Turkey through; a) oil embargo, b) use of NATO bases, c) deployment of nearly TR troops near the border, d) strong diplomatic support. Afterwards: above 36th parallel => Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and Operation Northern Watch (ONW).

29 Turkey-US Relations after the Cold WarIssues of Convergence in TR-US relations 4) Strategic Partnership between Turkey and Israel starting with the mid-1990s (US-TR-Israel) - common interest against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) - common interest for the peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute 5) Turkey’s EU membership bid 6) Energy development and security of Caspian Region (the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline project)

30 Turkey-US Relations after the Cold WarIssues of Divergence in TR-US relations 1) Iraq 2) PKK activities 3) Armenian Question 4) Rising Tensions between Israel and Turkey *the US’s benign neglect about “near abroad doctrine”, and the tilt towards Armenia against Azerbaijan…

31 Turkey-US Relations after the Cold WarThe Possible Areas of Cooperation 1) Promotion of Peace and Stability in the Middle East 2) Countering the proliferation of WMD (the Iran challenge) 3) The Integration of TR to the EU (Cyprus Issue) 4) Securing Energy Supplies from Persian Gulf & Caspian Basin

32 An Important Visit to Turkey (5-7 April 2009)

33 Significant Messages From ObamaLongevity of Turkish - American relations Importance of Republican principles Support to EU membership of Turkey Turkish geopolitical importance in terms of energy, dialogue, security… Model partnership The need of religious freedom Precise message against terrorism

34 Current Relations with the USStrategic interests for the parties (NATO, military cooperation, political and economic development in the Middle East and the Caucasus etc.) Regional security issues Turkey’s struggle for the EU membership Energy security in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin Armenian Question Developments in Iraq Tension between Turkey and Israel

35 Current Relations with the US2012 Presidential Elections Influence of economic problems on foreign policy Continuity of close relations Tensions due to new challenges

36 Relations with the EU Source: Delegation of The European Union to Turkey

37 Relations with the EU

38 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001

39 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001

40 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001

41 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001

42 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, 2001

43 Relations with the EU The weakest side of Turkish Foreign Policy in last years According to reports, rate of the people believing Turkish accession to the EU was 35% in It decreased to 17% in (TAVAK- Ağustos 2012) Current presidency: Lithuania (1 July-31 December 2013) Next: Greece (1 January-30 June 2014) Açılmayan maddeler: Kamu İhaleleri, Rekabet Politikası, Sosyal Politikalar ve İş Gücü, Kurumlar Açılmayan Chapterlar: Public Procurement Competition Policy Social Policy & Employment Other Issues Source: Standard Eurobarometer 66, 2007

44 Current Situation in Accession Negotiations- 1 chapter closed (Science and Research) - 14 chapter open - 16 chapter frozen 4 chapters are not still opened yet: Public Procurement Competition Policy Social Policy & Employment Other Issues Source: Delegation of The European Union to Turkey

45 Relations with the EU Total goods: EU Trade flows and balance, annual data Source: Directorate General For Trade

46 Relations with the EU Total Goods: Top trading partners 2012 TurkeyEuropean Union Source: Directorate General For Trade

47 Relations with the EU Erdogan’s statement on Shanghai Five and re-launch of chapters. European Parliament’s criticism after Gezi Park events Visa liberation dialogue between Turkey and the European Union started in Ankara on 16 December 2013

48 Turkey and the Middle EastImplications of Current Developments & Upheaval in the Middle East Tunisian Crisis Egyptian Crisis Syrian Crisis Libyan Crisis

49 Turkey’s 2012 Exports to the Middle Eastern Countries%26 %25 %20 %9 %7 %6 %2 %1.2 %0.6 %0.3 Total Volume: billion dollars

50 Turkey’s 2012 Imports from the Middle Eastern Countries%54 %16 %10 %7 %2 %1.1 %0.8 %0.7 %0.6 %0.4 %0.3 %0.2 Total Volume: billion dollars

51 Turkey’s Trade (Regional Groupings)1991 2000 2008 2011 %15 %7.5 %11 %9 Arab World

52 Economic Relations with the Middle East2010 2011 2012 Export Import Total Iran Iraq Egypt Israel Libya Tunisia Lebanon Syria Yemen Bahrain Kaynak: TÜİK

53 Regional Dynamics

54 Relations with Syria Important eventsThe uprising started in March Turkey called Assad regime for reform. Davutoğlu-Assad meeting on August End of bilateral talks after the meeting. Jet crisis on June 2012 Support of Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah to Syrian Regime Formation of National Council in Doha and recognition. On October , a Syrian bomb was dropped to Akcakale/Turkey and caused the death of 5 Turkish citizen. This was perceived as a reason for war. On October , a decision has been passed in Turkish Parliament for the military intervention in Syrian lands, although no intervention took place yet. Turkey retaliated in the same night. UN and NATO have passed the decisions that Turkey demanded. Syrian side apologized despite the retaliation. Preemptive caution? Decision of war? Ambiguities in the decision A Syrian plane flying from Moscow to Damascus was forced to land in Ankara. Military equipment found.

55 Relations with Syria Problems in economic relationsYear First Quarter Total Second Quarter Total Third Quarter Fourth Quarter Yearly Export/Import (TL) 2010 2011 2012 Problems in economic relations Refugee Problem: As of 8 January 2014, the total number of registered refugees in Turkey is 565,776 (UNHCR) European states lifted the arms embargo to the opposition forces. The US declared that they will increase the aids to the opposition On 27 September 2013, United Nations Security Council agreed on a resolution requiring Syria to eliminate its chemical weapons by mid Preparations for removing Syria’s chemical agents

56 Relations with Iraq Improving direct relations with Northern Iraq Kurdish authority Increasing trade with Northern Iraq and investments: Northern Iraq constitutes 70% of total Turkey-Iraq trade Turkey is the 4th biggest partner in Iraq after Germany, UK and Italy Trade volume increases despite the tensions with central government Progress in partnership in energy relations. Iraq’s share reached 17% in Turkey’s oil import Recent Developments and the Challenge from ISIS

57 Trade between Turkey and IraqMillion Dollars

58 Recent Developments on Kurdish IssueNewroz festivities on March 21 and peace messages towards Peace Process Öcalan: «This is the time for politics not guns» Support of the European Union and the US to the process Importance of process’ comprehensiveness and sustainability

59 Relations with Iran Importance of Syria in the Iran’s regional strategy Energy card of Iran and threats. Negotiations on Iran’s Nuclear Program Increasing Rivalry Iraq Missile Shield and reactions from Iran Syrian Crisis Deepening Sunni-Shiite divide? Elections in Iran: To what extent can Rouhani change Iranian stance on the above mentioned issues? Enerjide düşüş söz konusu Karikatür: New York Times, , Patrick Chappatte

60 Relations with Iran Trade between Turkey and Iran Million Dollars

61 Relations with Israel Last years in Turkish-Israeli relations:Davos (Jan 30, 2009) and “Low Chair” (Jan 11, 2010) Crises Turkey’s acceptance of Israel as a OECD member, a relative but short rapprochement (May 2010) Mavi Marmara Flotilla raid – May 31, 2011 Trade relations between Turkey and Israel continues despite the crises Palestine’s statehood bid at UN (Non-member observer state status – Nov 29, 2012).

62 Trade between Turkey and IsraelMillion Dollars

63 Relations with Israel -Obama’s Israel Visit and the Apology-First visit to Israel during Obama presidency Restoring relations between Israel and the US Obama and Israel Lobby Obama-Abbas meeting Lack of concrete measures in Israel-Palestine conflict Obama to Palestinians: «Give up your precondition of settlements for the re-launch of talks»

64 Relations with Israel -Obama’s Israel Visit and the Apology-Surprise «apology» from Netanyahu Turkey’s conditions for normalization of relations: Apology, Compensation and Lifting of blockade Rising prestige of Turkey East Mediterranean energy security Syrian Crisis and the shared interests Erdoğan’s potential Gaza visit and balance within Palestine

65 Other Important Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy

66 Relations with China 2011: 40th year of the establishment of diplomatic ties Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey (Feb 21, 2012) 7 agreements worth 4,3 billion dollars were signed Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to China (April 9, 2012)

67 Trade between China and TurkeyMilyon Dolar 2012 statistics cover the first 11 months

68 Strategic targets as a result of increasing energy needs :Cooperation with neighbors Regional stability Central Asia energy links China-Russia-Iran triangle: Russia and China’s struggles to loosen sanctions on Iran Economic opportunities

69 Relations with Africa 2005 African Year and Observer Status in African Union 1st Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in 2008 UN 4th Least Developed Countries Conference in Istanbul in 2011 10 new routes from Turkish Airlines between 2006 and 2010 TİKA offices opened after 2005 Activities of international aid organizations in Africa Number of Turkish embassies in Africa was 12 in 2009; by 2013 it reached to 31

70 Relations with Africa Prime Minister’s Africa trip on January 7- 11, 2013 with about 300 businessman Visits to Gabon, Niger and Senegal Exports from Turkey to Africa in 2012 is 12 billion dollars, trade volume is 18 billion dollars Erdoğan: «We aim to reach 50 billion dollars of trade volume in 2015» A call to Turkish businessman to invest in Subsaharan Africa Criticism of colonialism Traditional French influence in Africa and competition with China

71 Relations with Russia Russia has returned to global stageRussia’s active role in Georgian Crisis and Nagorno-Karabakh issue Increasing trade volume after global economic crisis. Russia in Syrian Crisis. Energy Relations with Russia: Nabucco, TANAP and South Stream Toplam İhracat Toplam İthalat 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

73 Turkey’s Current Foreign Policy DynamicsTurkey has already a critical role to play for enhancement of peace and stability within its region as a “benign” regional power. However, it can play a more constructive and effective role if it successfully fulfills three challenging tasks by: Consolidating its democracy Maintaining good neighborly relations Operating within a predominantly European and Transatlantic framework, while pursuing a multilateral foreign policy with extensive Eurasian ties. One interlocking area for the European & Eurasian links of Turkey and an important factor in its quest for becoming a benign regional power is the field of Energy Politics.

74 Geopolitics of the Caspian Basin and Energy Politics: The Role of Turkey in Eurasian Energy Dynamics

75 -Outline- Concept of Energy SecurityGlobal Energy Outlook: General Trends and Major Actors in Production & Consumption The Role of Turkey in Eurasian Energy Politics Görseller: 1) Russian Energy coperation başlığı altında bir yazıda belirmiş Rus ve Hintli bakanın enerjiyle ilgili görüşeceği yazıyor haberde 2) Network Europe Pipeline Politcs: Putting Turkey in for new energy deals diyor hocam ama neresi olduğunu söylemiyor

76 Energy Security Due to the exponentially growing demand, the concept of energy security has been receiving much more attention Energy security is defined by the governments drive to secure their energy supplies at affordable prices Key goal: to mitigate the vulnerability of a state to the possible disruption of energy supplies through avoiding over-dependence on one energy producer and by diversifying its suppliers and supply routes Açıklama:The church spire of the northern Bavarian village of Hergolshausen stands next to the cooling towers of the Grafenrheinfeld nuclear power station. Image: A church spire in a northern Bavarian village. Photographs: Arnd Wiegmann/Reuters

77 Energy Security Barry Buzan and some members of the Copenhagen School have broadened the concept of security to embrace political, economic, social and environmental aspects, in addition to the component of hard security based on military power. The term energy security, while heavily based on the economic dimension, comprises all the above mentioned components of security in terms of its impact on politics, environment and the society. [1] For a comprehensive discussion of this broadened concept of security see, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo. And London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Resim: -Another Wake-Up Call? Europe Remains Divided Over Energy Security Policy

78 Energy Security In the complex interaction between (i) energy producers, (ii) energy transit countries and (iii) energy consumers, the Gulf region and the Middle East, as well as Eurasia and the Caspian Basin emerge as extremely critical areas for global energy security The Gulf region will maintain its position at the heart of energy politics Caspian energy reserves are also significant for responding to the increasing oil and gas demand Resim 1) Exxon Group wins Iraq oil başlıklı bir yazı Resim 2) EU is Losing its Grip on Caspian Gas Corridor- resimin üzerini açtığımız zaman turkish gas pipeline olarak çıkıyor hocam Resim2)

79 Global Energy Outlook: General Trends and Major Actors in Production & Consumption

80 General Trends Fossil fuels will continue to dominate the global energy mix (constituting around 85 % of the total demand), while oil remains the leading fuel. On current policies, world energy needs will be almost 60% higher in 2030 than now. Energy trade between regions more than doubles by 2030, most of it being still in the form of oil. 63 % of the oil to be produced in 2030 will be traded between regions compared to 46 % in 2002.

81 Proved Oil Reserves BP Statistical Review of World Energy June OilJanuary 1, 20091, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010

82 Distribution of Proved Oil ReservesBP Statistical Review of World Energy June BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013

83 Proved Natural Gas ReservesBP Statistical Review of World Energy June Natural gas January 1, 2009 6, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010

84 Distribution of Proved Natural Gas ReservesBP Statistical Review of World Energy June BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013

85 Shale Gas: Overview 453 trillion cubic meters of technically recoverable estimated reserves in the whole world. Turkey’s estimated reserves are 1,8 trillion cubic meters , yet it’s too early for Turkey to invest in shale gas due to financial reasons and the profitability (EIA 2011). A possible game changer in the world energy market Abundant in many oil-rich and oil-poor countries, including the USA, China, Latin America and Europe Important for the future political relations between energy trading nations Environmental concerns in extraction are high Might create an economic boom and large employment

86 Shale Gas: Reserves Country Reserves (trillion cubic meters) China 36,1 United States 24,4 Argentina 21,9 Mexico 19,3 South Africa 13,7 Australia 11,2 Canada 11,0 Libya 8,2 Algeria 6,5 Brazil 6,4 Poland 5,3 France 5,1 *Red and yellow areas are assessed basins with and without resource estimate respectively. Source: EIA 2011

87 Shale Gas: Economic ImpactsExpected to greatly accelerate the growth of some developing countries 500,000 jobs in the shale gas sector have been created in the USA alone since 2008 Not as attractive and promising for the European governments: greater environmental concerns in Europe Harder to extract in some regions like Europe, due to geography and the distribution of population, in comparison to the USA and China Pessimistic perspectives also existent among academics and researchers in terms of the economic advantages

88 Shale Gas: EnvironmentConsumption: low-carbon choice, wiser alternative than coal and oil. Production: mixed opinions; businesses claim minimal damage occurs, societies and academics are not quite sure Hydraulic fracturing requires copious water and chemicals damage underground waters and soil

89 World Primary Energy DemandFossil fuels will continue to meet roughly 80% of all the world energy demand until 2030.

90 Future Production and ConsumptionWhile the Middle East, North Africa and the Caspian regions offer the most (physically) reliable and rich resources for the coming decades; developing Asia, the U.S. and EU will continue to be the biggest energy-thirsty markets with increasing dependency on energy imports from these regions. Necdet Pamir, “Energy (In)Security and The Most Recent Lesson: The Russia-Ukraine Gas Crisis”, 2005, p. 5. 90

91 China Source: World Energy Outlook, IEANecdet Pamir, “Energy (In)Security and The Most Recent Lesson: The Russia-Ukraine Gas Crisis”, 2005, p. 8. Source: World Energy Outlook, IEA 91

92 The Role of Turkey In Energy Politics

93 Turkey emerges as a key countryTurkey is at an energy crossroads. Three-fourths of the world’s proven oil and gas resources are located in regions neighboring Turkey. And with the increasing dependence of OECD and developing Asian countries on Middle Eastern and Greater Caspian oil Turkey’s role as an important energy player has emerged. This energy dependency is likely to have further major geopolitical implications. Given its unique geographical location between the Middle East and the Caspian regions on the one hand and the energy consuming markets on the other, Turkey stands as a key country in ensuring energy security. 93

94 The East-West Energy CorridorThe East-West Energy Corridor has been developed in close cooperation of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the United States. The Corridor essentially aims at transporting Caucasian and Central Asian oil as well as natural gas to western markets through safe alternative routes. The main components of the Corridor are: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude oil pipeline The Shah-Deniz natural gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum) The Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline projects, rail roads and other infrastructure

95 The BTC oil pipeline Completed in 2006 Length: 1767 km. Cost: Aprrox. 4 billion dollars One million barrels of Caspian crude oil is pumped each day Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a Transit Agreement in June 2006 to connect Kazakh oil to BTC BTC is an alternative route to Russia and Iran for crude oil

96 Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline and its prolongation to Kazakhstan (Shah-Deniz Project)96

97 Nabucco Pipeline ProjectA nascent natural gas transit project. Would be transporting gas primarily from Azerbaijan to Central Europe via the Turkish gas hub of Erzurum Significant for EU countries in terms of diversifying their supply and for bypassing Russian territory Serious problems: Lack of throughput commitment Resource availability Prices and financing

98 EU Interest In Turkish CorridorTurkish territory effective way to transport energy from west to east Important point  Turkey need more outside capital for infrastructure European Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to support Nabuco pipeline by funding %70 of the cost Article of Carl Bildt and Massimo D’alema:‘’Turkey is a key actor in the realm of energy security. Given the uncertain state of energy markets, and the stakes involved, it is our shared interest to incorporate Turkey in a functioning integrated system’’ Europe-Asia Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: EU-Russian Relations and Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor Ali Tekin a; Paul A. Williams a a Harvard University, Online Publication Date: 01 March 2009

99 As An Energy Corridor: TURKEYRegions close to Turkey possess over 70% of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves Due to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline s Turkey provides an alternative route to Russian dominated transit corridor. HOWEVER: Turkey has own dependence  52% of its own gas consumption comes from Russia. Europe-Asia Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: EU-Russian Relations and Turkey's Role as an Energy Corridor Ali Tekin a; Paul A. Williams a a Harvard University, Online Publication Date: 01 March 2009

100 Total Turkish Energy Consumption in 2011World Energy Council Turkey, 2012

101 Turkey and Azerbaijan in Regional Energy Game -Turkey’s Energy Dependency-Crude Oil Import Turkey imports 92% of its total demand of crude oil.

102 Turkey and Azerbaijan in Regional Energy Game -Turkey’s Energy Dependency-Natural Gas Imports Data Source: Doğalgaz Piyasası Daire Başkanlığı, Doğalgaz Piyasası 2010 Yılı Sektör Raporu (Ankara, 2011), 24. Turkey imports 98% of its total demand of natural gas.

103 Wind Power Plants in TurkeySource:

104 Thermal Power Plants in TurkeySource:

105 Hydroelectric Power Plants in TurkeySource:

106 The Relation between Energy Security and Energy EfficiencyIt is crucial to use intelligent diversification in order to increase energy security. This can be by; Diversification of energy resources, Diversification of energy suppliers, Diversification of energy routes Efficient use of energy resources through diverse technological and strategic tools is important for the balance between supply security, economic development and competitiveness and environment and sustainability. This is why alternative energy resources like renewables, nuclear energy became increasingly important. Energy efficiency is one of the most important parts of energy security by constituting the domestic branch of it. Decrease in energy consumption by its efficient use both decrease the dependency to foreign resources (or cause it to increase slowly) and increase the energy security.

107 Energy Efficiency in Turkey by SectorsThe most important sectors in the energy efficiency activities are as following: Industry * Transportation Buildings and Supplies * Energy Production and Distribution *If the energy efficiency measures can be implemented in these sectors successfully, energy savings in 2020 will probably be at least 20%. Veri Kaynağı: Erdal Çalıkoğlu, “Enerji Verimliliği (Enver)&Kanunu” (Elektrik İşleri Etüt İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, n.d.), Energy Consumption by Sectors (TEP) (2020)

108 Energy Efficiency in Turkey and the WorldVeri Kaynağı: International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics 2011. Energy intensity performances of Turkey and some actors of global politics

109 Energy Efficiency in Turkey and the Other Developing CountriesBRICS and MIST: The G20 countries that performed exceptional economic development in last years: - Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) - Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey (MIST) Despite the high development numbers, there is no successful measures implemented for energy efficiency yet. In general, energy efficiency performances of these countries are worse than the world average. Turkey is one of the most successful countries among the BRICS, MIST and other developing G20 countries In that sense, one of the aims of Turkish energy policy is to be in a leading position among these countries in energy efficiency

110 Energy Intensity in BRICS, MIST, Other Developing G20 and TurkeyVeri Kaynağı: International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics 2011.

111 Implications of Energy Intensity in TurkeyIf Turkey could save 10% in energy in last 10 years, it would be a 25 billion $ saving and 50 million tone less CO2 emission. In this regard, the main target of Turkish energy efficiency policies are; to develop a holistic national energy efficiency strategy which is applicable to all sectors for near future, to achieve at least 20% decrease in Turkish energy intensity numbers, to make energy intensity around 0,20-0,22 which is close to OECD average.

112 Turkey’s Nuclear ProgramTurkey plans to have three nuclear power plants by 2023. There are talks with mainly Russia and Japan for the construction of power plants. Turkish Parliament approved a bill on an agreement between Russia and Turkey for the construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, a town in Mersin province, in July 2010. Russian state-owned atomic power company ROSATOM is likely to start building the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2013, and the first reactor is expected to begin generating electricity in 2018. Agreement with Japanese-French consortium for the second nuclear power-plant in Sinop. A 22 billion dollar investment Minister Yıldız: «Third nuclear power plant will be built by Turkish engineers»

113 Security Challenges of Turkey’s Nuclear ProgramThe planned area for the nuclear power plant is a earthquake-prone zone. Risk of Radiation Leak Chernobyl Disaster and its effects in Northern Turkey Radioactive Waste and Problems in storing Environmental Problems

114 Trans-Anatolian Pipeline ProjectOn December 26, 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan have signed a memorandum of understanding for the transfer of Azeri gas to Europe. Intergovernmental agreement to launch Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) was inked on June 26, by Erdoğan and Aliyev. The projected amount of gas to transport is 16 billion cubic meters per year. 6 billion cubic meters/year will remain in Turkey, 10 billion cubic meters/year will be transferred to Europe. The capacity of gas flow is expected to reach to 31 billion m3 in fifteen years. According to Erdogan, the first gas will flow in the pipeline in 2018.

115 Trans-Anatolian Pipeline Project

116 Fate of Nabucco After the memorandum of understanding, it was argued that the Trans-Anatolian pipeline project will be the end of Nabucco project or at least a serious competitor to it. Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Yıldız: «It is not the end of Nabucco project. The two projects can be merged. Azeri gas will be connected to Nabucco in Bulgaria instead of Georgia» Two days after the intergovernmental agreement, Shah Deniz gas producers’ consortium announced Nabucco West as the route for the Caspian gas into Europe. TANAP will be a "kiss of death" for the Nabucco pipeline project in its current form, but will revive it as a more limited, yet more feasible project. TANAP will connect to Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Azeri gas will be transferred to Europe.

117 Recent Developments -South Stream-2 days after the agreement for Trans- Anatolian Pipeline (on Dec 28,2011), Turkey and Russia agreed on transferring Russian gas to Europe through Turkish territorial waters. 63 billion cubic meters per year. A bypass project for Russia after Ukraine. Putin: «A New Year’s gift to Russia.» Discount in gas prices in return

118 In conclusion The world energy demand continues and will continue to increase in the future The importance of the Middle East, Caspian Region and Africa in energy production/export and that of the actors like EU, USA and China in terms of energy consumption/import would rise increasingly As also indicated by recent developments in Eurasia (Ukraine- Russia crisis) and in the Euro-Mediterranean region (reduction of supply from Libya) source and transit route diversification is essential for energy security. Energy efficiency is becoming increasingly important as well.

119 As a result Due to these worldwide and regional trends as well as Turkey’s invaluable geostrategic position as a major crossroads in terms of energy transportation, Turkey will continue to play a crucial role in regional energy politics… Resim 1) BTC ham boru hattı resmi Resim 2)

120 Thank You!

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