1 NICHE CONSTRUCTION, CONCEPTUAL CAPACITIES, AND THE QUESTION OF “POSTHUMANISM”Joseph Rouse, Wesleyan University Symposium on “Action, Agency, and (Post)Humanism” Aalborg University, 11 September 2017

2 OVERVIEW OF THE TALK I --- At issue in debates over humanism & post-humanism: intentionality, agency, conceptual capacities, “intelligence,” etc. II --- Post-humanist alternatives to “human exceptionalism” III --- How a conception of “social” practices as biological niche construction recognizes human specificity, learns from the post-humanisms, & dissolves the disputes

3 Intentionality, “intelligence,” conceptual understanding, etc.Part I: Intentionality, “intelligence,” conceptual understanding, etc.

4 The central issue in philosophy Since ~1900: “Intentionality”Difficult to characterize generally, because its proper description is disputed Also characterized as consciousness, self-consciousness, conceptual capacities, “intelligence,” agency, or acting “in light of” norms (not “according” to norms) My preferred versions: “conceptual normativity” or “conceptual articulation” Three points of general agreement amidst these disputes: 1) Core examples of intentionality: mental states, speech, and actions 2) “Content”: an intended object & “meaning” (a way of “taking” it as…) 3) Normativity: assessed for existence of its object & correctness of how it’s “taken”

5 The post-Humanism question: Is intentionality only human?Most philosophical views treat intentionality as a “special” human capacity: Self-consciousness “Intelligence”/flexible behavior Acting in light of norms “Theory of mind” or having the concept of belief Language Philosophical naturalists typically reduce the gap between humans and other animals by diminishing the capacities “specially” attributed to us Post-humanists instead treat robust forms of agency, mind, language, or “intelligence” as more widely distributed

6 Post-humanist challengesPart II Post-humanist challenges

7 Three forms of post-humanismActor-Network Theory (B. Latour, et al.): Rejecting distinctions between nature and human society Treating human and non-human “actants” symmetrically Biological Conceptions of Intentionality/Mind (3 versions): Life as mind (E. Thompson, F. Varela) Recognizing diversity of animal intelligence/agency (F. de Waal, C. Wolfe, J. Derrida) Ethical defenses of animals (e.g., P. Singer) ascribe ethical standing, but not participation Intentionality as instrumental rationality (D. Dennett, M. Okrent) Feminist materialism (K. Barad, et al.) Ascribing ontological priority to intra-active phenomena over agencies & objects “Agencies of observation” incorporate apparatuses & practices

8 Learning from post-humanistsEach version of post-humanism gets something importantly right Actor-Networkers rightly reject nature/culture or nature/society dualisms Biological approaches rightly treat intentionality as biological, and rightly recognize diversity, flexibility & rationality of other organisms’ capacities Feminist materialism rightly makes phenomena, not objects, locus of normativity Each version misses the biological specificity of conceptual articulation They mistakenly treat agency/intentionality/conceptual-articulation as a general capacity rather than as specific to our biological lineage Each also misconstrues different aspects of conceptual articulation

9 Part III Niche construction, conceptual normativity, and the dissolution of the question of post-humanism

10 Overview of themes of part III:From neo-Darwinism to the “extended evolutionary synthesis” Organisms, environments, and normativity as biological phenomena Language & other conceptual capacities as behavioral niche construction The partial autonomy of “social” practices and two-dimensional normativity The biological specificity and “weirdness” of 2-D normativity

11 The “extended synthesis”20th Century evolutionary biology was shaped by the “modern synthesis”: Organisms vary randomly via mutations; “external” environment selects variants Evolution as gradual changes in gene frequencies, by selection, drift, exaptation Sociobiology, evo. psychology, “memetics” as failed programs for “culture” These failures encouraged non-naturalist & cognitivist-representationalist accounts “Extended synthesis” offers new resources for biological intentionality Developmental evolution Ecological-developmental biology & developmental systems theory Niche construction

12 Organisms and environmentsOrganisms as goal-directed processes of “making a living,” whose goal is the continuation and reproduction of that process in changing circumstances Lives & lineages can FAIL to fulfill their goal; organisms constitute natural normativity Organism’s environment is not its entire physical circumstances, but only what is developmentally, behaviorally, or selectively relevant to its way of life Its “way of life” in turn cannot be specified except via relations to environment Organisms are not self-contained entities, but dynamic processes of goal-directed, normative intra-action with what thereby becomes their environment Organism   environment relations are bi-directional: Environments shape organisms by phenotypic plasticity and natural selection Organisms shape developmental/selective environments by niche construction

13 ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE & ENVIRONMENTAL ATTUNEMENTSome organisms are “detection agents”: behavior directly induced by presence or absence of environmental features Cuing behavior by prior behavior & outcomes yields complex behavior patterns Detection agents vulnerable to deception by other organisms A successful strategy when detected features are mostly abiotic Other organisms develop more flexible, “intelligent” behavior by close attunement to possibly conflicting environmental indications/affordances Behavior NOT directly induced by one feature, but as holistic environ. response Learning: past behavior & outcomes can be part of what organism responds to “Intelligence” requires close attunement to conflicting aspects of environment “Intelligent” animals thereby have very complex, sophisticated, flexible behavior

14 Language as behavioral-material niche constructionNiche construction (NC): organisms change their environments in ways that change the selection pressures on their lineages Mobility and material transformation are familiar forms of NC Behavioral niche construction occurs when behavioral patterns are part of a developmental & selective environment that reproduces that behavior Language (and other conceptual capacities) as material-behavioral NC Linguistic utterances are perceptually-practically salient environmental patterns Humans normally develop, & only develop normally, in discursive environments Language and other conceptual repertoires co-evolved with human ways of life Languages only exist in learnable, reproducible forms Humans evolved under selection pressure for linguistic facility

15 “social” Practices and two-dimensional normativity“Social” practices are distinctive forms of niche construction in our lineage Language, imagery, dramatics, music, & other conceptual “repertoires” Equipmental complexes and differentiated roles Institutions, games, religions, economic life, sciences, “recreation,” and more Practices as partially autonomous: their performances are proximally responsive and accountable to other aspects of the practice Only partially autonomous, because whole practice is also responsive and accountable to its place in a (human) way of life “Social” practices are biological novelty with “two-dimensional” normativity Performances assessed both within a practice, and as part of overall (way of) life Meaning/truth, appropriateness/success, legitimacy/effectiveness, etc.

16 the biological specificity (weirdness) of 2-D normativityOther organisms develop and evolve, but their (1-D) biological normativity only concerns whether they live, reproduce, and maintain a lineage Selection operates holistically on entire phenotype: energetic resources, metabolic & cognitive demands, avoiding predators, reproductive strategy, etc. Multiplicity of practices, evolved through iterated, ratcheted cycles of niche construction, allowed for 2-dimensionality of human ways of life Practices assessed both for whether they continue, & how they proceed Human way of life thereby tradeoffs between whether & how it continues Two-dimensional normativity is not a general capacity other organisms lack Not a “desirable” trait, but a loss of environmentally attuned “intelligence” Not yet clear whether it was a successful evolutionary innovation in our lineage

17 Concluding remarks

18 beyond humanist & Post-humanist anthropomorphismsAgainst non-naturalist humanisms: Intentionality (conceptually articulated normativity) is a biological phenomenon, an evolutionary outcome of iterated niche construction in our lineage Not a “special” human ability, but co-evolution of our primate bodies, capacities & ways of life with hyper-niche-constructed environments (including language) Not a general capacity, but a homologous trait among hominids Against post-humanisms: Criticisms of humanism mistake conceptual capacities for a general trait Efforts to ascribe language, agency, “mind” to others as anthropomorphic Other organisms have distinctive forms of environmental directedness, flexible behavior, & “intelligent” responses without intentionality/conceptual-articulation

19 Assessing post-humanismsActor Network Theory Rightly rejects nature/society and nature/culture distinctions (as does fem. mat.) Overlooks (but relies on) normativity as biological (scallops & microbes) Collapses 2-D normativity into 1-D (“trials of strength“ but no grasp of meaning) Biological post-humanisms Rightly recognize biological character of natural normativity Overlook differences between animal “intelligence” & 2-dimensional normativity Project conceptual articulation onto organisms’ holistic environmental responses Feminist materialism (Barad) Rightly understands conceptual normativity as “phenomenon” rather than trait Rightly thereby rejects conceptual articulation as view from “sideways on” Overlooks (but relies on) biological basis for conceptual normativity (brittlestars) Overlooks role of two-dimensionality in conceptual articulation of phenomena