2 media battle As early as 2001, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared: ‘We must get our message across to the masses of the nation and break the media siege imposed on the Jihad movement. This media battle is an independent battle that we must launch side by side with the military battle’

3 Political agenda According to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, funder of Daesh and leader of Al-Qaeda , this agenda is constituted of chronological steps: 'The first step is to expel the enemy, then establish the Islamic state, then we set forth to conquer the lands of Muslims to return them back to us, then after that, we fight the Kuffar (unbelievers) until they accept one of the three. I have been sent with the sword, between the hands of the hour; this is our political agenda' (quoted in Bockstette, 2010, p.8)

4 Daesh’s ‘Political’ agenda1. Expel the Ennemy 2. Establish the Islamic State 3. Conquer the Lands of the Muslims 4. Fight the Kuffar (Unbelievers) Communicate their ‘political agenda’ to various audiences

5 Literature Review Fondamentalism and Religion (Bourg, 1980; Tibi, 2014) Politicized religions (Tibi, 2007; Haynes et al., 2008) Religionisation of politics (Ivanescu, 2010; Derrida and Cherif, 2008)

6 Media and terrorist inputOn a theoretical level, research on media and terrorist groups has focused principally upon: Response of western publics and media groups (Greenberg 2002) Crisis communication policy (Noll 2003) Media’s portrayal of terrorism (Venkatraman 2004) all from the perspective of the western media producer

7 Media and terrorist inputResearch has also focused on classical media coverage of terrorist acts and western responses in: the printed press (D’Haenens and Bink 2007, Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003, Poole 2000, 2006, Papacharmissi and Oliveira 2008) television (Rogers 2003, Blondheim and Liebes 2002) radio (Stempel and Hargrove 2002) Satirical cartoons (Hussain 2007) using framing theory as defined by Entman (2007:167) as the selection of 'some aspects of a perceived reality and make[ing] them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation and/or moral evaluation’.

8 Media and terrorist inputInternet is a venue vital to the research of terrorist groups (Weimann,2006) Research on media and terrorist groups has focused on the overall ability of Jihadi groups to: Recruit (Ulph 2005a, 2005b) Fundraise (Atran 2005) Train, and operate (Awan 2007, Bunt 2003)

9 Media and terrorist inputThe content of Jihadist media products (Awan 2007) has been examined in the form of: Blogs (Berkeley 2006) User-generated content (Mosemghvdlishvili and Jansz 2012, Van Zoonen et.al. 2011) Videos (Salem et.al. 2008, Al-Ghazzi, 2014) Websites, forums, Internet Relay Chat platforms, channels, blogs, social networking and file sharing platforms (Awan 2007)

10 Methods and aims

11 The Syrian conflict: A youtube war?First digital war which attributes a critical role in narrative construction to videos as user-generated content (Smit et al., 2015; Vandevoordt, 2015; Wall and El Zahed, 2015). Execution videos framed as legitimate 'acts of Jihad' (Awan, 2007, p. 396) encoding the ‘holy war’ narrative

12 “Smart Narrowcasting”‘It is about the kinds of rhetorical and aesthetical strategies that might best appeal to the envisioned specialized audience' based on an 'appropriate style, format, visual and storytelling language for specific audiences' (Ristovska, 2016, p.2; Gregory, 2006, p.198)

14 To what extent does the production of execution videos, including beheadings, immolation, and shooting, contributes to Daesh's 'political agenda' and 'media battle'? These videos could further our theoretical and empirical understanding of how Daesh conceptualizes the nexus between: Religious Ideology Global and Local Media Global political Agenda building

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19 Rhetorical devices Political narrative: 1.Quoting Daesh leadership2. Propagation of operational and ideological success Religious narrative: 1.The Crusades 2.The City of ‘Dabiq’ 3. Law of Retaliation 4. The Quran

20 1. The crusades/the Crusaders'master narrative‘: a "trans-historical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture" (Schmid, 2014, p.3) used for 1. Daesh promotes specific popular understandings of the past (Neiger et al., 2011) and legitimize an abstract conflict between 'good' and 'evil' (Schmid, 2011) 2. Western civilians, governments, and militaries are all unified as an 'unholy enemy' under a 'satanic coalition' and designated by Daesh as 'crusaders' whose defeat in 1187 led to the Muslim re-capture of Jerusalem

21 Demonization of the “Others”Immolation video of the Jordanian pilot Al-Kaseasbeh: "When the crusader campaigns ensued on the lands of Islam, the butcher applied his blade and delegated his agents to erect towers overflowing with apostasy and treachery“ In videos of Iraqi Army soldier beheadings Daesh points at the “ongoing Crusader coalition”

22 2. The City of ‘Dabiq’ Execution videos of westerners are systematically said to be located in 'Dabiq‘ Islamic eschatology refering to the events of Yawm al- Qiyāmah (“Day of Resurrection”) This place is believed to be where Muslims of the Ummah and apostates will face each other in a final war.

24 The law of Retaliation Law of Retaliation (al-Qasas in Islam) known in Judeo- Christian culture as 'lex talionis'. This narrative pattern is used in order to frame the executions as divine justice against both Muslims and western foreign policy in the Middle East. Quran, 2:178: "O you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution (Qasas) for those murdered – the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female (…)".

25 Narrative pattern and demonization"Because of our parliament’s decision to attack the Islamic State I [Henning], as a member of the British public, will now pay the price for that decision.” Beheading of Herve Gourdel to 'avenge the victims in Algeria of French President Francois Hollande'. Immolation of Jordanian pilot al-Kaseasbeh as retaliation against King Abdullah II and his government for supporting the 'satanic coalition'. The beheading video of a Peshmerga fighter from Iraqi Kurdistan as retaliation against 'leaders of the American-Kurdish Alliance'

26 “Jews and Christians and Nusayri”Coran used to set up categories Regarding the alleged Muslim Russian spies, the Quran is quoted as follows: “Let not believers take disbelievers as allies rather than believers” (Al-Imran 3:28) The 'Nusayri' (Muslim apostate) is referred by Quranic verse: “And he amongst you that turns to them [for friendship] is of them,” (partial verse: Al-Ma’idah, 5:51). Full verse as follows: "O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends: They are but friends to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them is of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people.“ Here the 'Jew and the Christian' serves as a symbol of what is forbidden, what excludes a Muslim from the Ummah.

27 The Christians Executioner states that those who refuse Islam deserve "nothing to save them from the edge of the sword." Christians who pay jizyah in lieu of converting, Daesh states that it "will defend them and they will seek judgment from us in the Islamic courts. We will return their rights back to them".

28 Corman and Schiffelbein (2008); Bockettet (2008) and Corman (2006)Insiders Outsiders Ummah Radicalized jihadists and their supporters Sympathizers and neutral Muslims throughout the world Adversaries 'Near enemies': 'troublemakers', apostates of secular Muslim regimes 'Far enemies': Jews, Unbelievers, Crusaders, the 'West'

29 Herfroy-Mischler and Barr, 2015Insiders Outsiders Ummah Daesh's Jihadists 'Satanic Coalition': 1.Westerners 2. Crusaders 3. Jews and Christians Christians who accept the 'dhimmah contract' and pay jizyah (protected minorities within the Islamic State) Symbolic 'Westerners': Syrian Army Symbolic 'Crusaders': Jordanian, Iraqi, Kurds and Afghan Muslims: symbolic 'Jew and Christian': Syrian paramilitaries and spies

30 Conclusions On the digital media and terrorism literature we show the relevance of audience segmentation (Webster and Ksiazek 2012) in terrorist output to global media, and demonstrate that this segmentation is also relevant for in-groups. Audience segmentation allows ISIL's execution videos to act as: 1. Executing westerners is framed as a retaliation for the west violating Muslims' honour, the 'Islamic State' being the political authority protecting the Ummah from the west 2. The ex-communication ('Takfir') from the Ummah of specific types of Muslims as a political and religious purge 3. Spreading Daesh's religious and political agenda to global, regional and local 'smart narrowcasting' (as opposed to 'broadcast') audiences selected for their specifically imagined potential to act and to help achieve a designated goal

31 Daesh A udience segmentation : Smart narrowcasting to religiously segmented audiences Retaliation against the ‘West’ Ex-Communication from the Ummah Politico-Religious agenda spreading On the digital media and terrorism literature we show the relevance of audience segmentation (Webster and Ksiazek 2012) in terrorist output to global media, and demonstrate that this segmentation is also relevant for in-groups. Daesh A udience segmentation : 1. Executing westerners is framed as a retaliation for the west violating Muslims' honour, the 'Islamic State' being the political authority protecting the Ummah from the west 2. The ex-communication ('Takfir') from the Ummah of specific types of Muslims as a political and religious purge 3. Spreading Daesh's religious and political agenda to global, regional and local 'smart narrowcasting' (as opposed to 'broadcast') audiences selected for their specifically imagined potential to act and to help achieve a designated goal

32 Framing of an ideology to be spread by Global MediaReligious narrative Political narrative Framing of an ideology to be spread by Global Media