1 SAMPOL 204: Varieties of Political Regimes in Latin AmericaSummary Lecture. Wednesday 26 April 2017, , Faculty of Social Sciences, Small Auditorium Einar Berntzen

2 Use approximately 1 hour to answer the following question:Give an overview of the history of democracy in Latin America and its cyclical pattern of development in the 20th century.

3 Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán 2013: democracy defined1. The head of government and the legislature must be chosen through open and fair competitive elections 2. Universal adult suffrage for citizens 3. Protection of political and civil rights 4. The elected authorities must exercise real governing power

4 Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán 2013: Classification of political regimesTrichotomous classification: Democratic: no significant violations of any of the 4 criteria Semi-democratic: partial but not flagrant violations to any of the 4 creteria Authoritarian: one or more flagrant violations of the 4 criteria

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8 Huntington 1991: waves of democratization and authoritarianismHuntington’s 3 global «waves» of democratization: 1rst wave ( ) 1rst reverse wave ( ) 2nd wave ( ) 2nd reverse wave ( ) 3rd wave ( )

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10 Region-wide waves of regime change in Latin America1rst wave 2nd wave ( ): 2 moments: 1rst moment ( ) Reverse moment ( ) and 2nd moment ( ) 2nd reverse wave ( ) 3rd wave ( )

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13 Use approximately 1 hour to answer the following question:How have trends in US policy towards Latin America affected democratic regime development in the region?

14 Trends in US policy towards Latin America: Intervention (exporting «democracy») in Central America and the Caribbean (Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua , Haïti ; Dominican Republic ) : Good Neighbour: non-intervention : The Cold War: intervention

15 US policy towards democracy in Latin America, 1900-2008: US policy towards Latin America was unfavourable to democracy To varying degrees US policy was favourable to democracy in Latin America: , and 1985-

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17 US policy unfavourable to democracy : The Cold War: Guatemala 1954 : Brazil 1964, Dominican Republic 1965, Chile and Uruguay 1973 : El Salvador, Guatemala

18 US policy favourable to democracy : J.F. Kennedy Alliance for Progress : Jimmy Carter. Dominican Republic 1978, Ecuador 1979, Peru 1985-: Haïti 1986, Argentina 1987/88, Chile 1988, Paraguay 1989, Panama 1989, Peru 1992, Guatemala 1993, Haïti 1994, Paraguay 1996. Exceptions: Venezuela 2002, Haïti 2004

19 Use approximately 2 hours to answer the following question:Which are the defining characteristics of sultanistic regimes? Are there any common background factors which may explain the emergence of sultanistic regimes in Latin America? What characterizes the demise of sultanistic regimes? What are the prospects for democracy in transitions from sultanistic regimes? Use empirical examples

20 Sultanistic regimes in Latin AmericaThe prototype: Trujillo ( ) in the Dominican Republic The Somozas ( ) in Nicaragua Batista ( ) in Cuba Baby Doc Duvalier ( ) in Haïti Noriega ( ) in Panama Borderline cases: Papa Doc Duvalier ( ) in Haïti and Stroessner ( ) in Paraguay

21 The defining characteristics of sultanistic regimes1. The Blurring of the Line between Regime and State 2. Personalism 3. Constitutional Hypocrisy 4. The Narrow Social Bases of Sultanism 5. Distorted Capitalism

22 1. The Blurring of the Line between Regime and State«Regime»=the patterns of allocation, use, and abuse of power in a polity. For understanding authoritarian regimes (and transitions to democracy) it is useful to distinguish between regime and state. Under sultanistic rule the distinction between regime and state is blurred, and in extreme cases of sultanism one can even speak of a fusion between regime and state.

23 2. Personalism: cult of personalityCult of personality: sultanistic leaders crave charisma and surround themselves with the trappings of charismatic leadership precisely because they know that they lack it. They invent titles for themselves: e.g. «Benefactor de la Patria» (Trujillo)

24 2. Personalism: dynasticismSons: Nicaragua: the Somozas; Haïti: «Papa» and «Baby» Doc; Dominican Republic: The dictator’s son Ramfis became brigadier general at the tender age of 9 Wives: In Haïti both first ladies wielded considerable influence and were involved in corruption

25 Personalism and dynasticismIt is the combination of personalism and dynasticism that is specific to sultanism. The reason for the dynasticism of sultanistic regimes is perhaps that the rulers feel that they can trust only their family and kin. Most often the sultanistic rulers come from humble origins and are looked down upon by the traditional elite. Somoza García: used-car salesman; Trujillo grew up in poor circumstances; Batista was a mulatto who had worked as a seargent stenographer in the Cuban army, cane cutter, carpenter and railway worker

26 Personalism and dynasticism (cont.)Given the lowly origins and the tenuous social base of their regimes, sultanistic rulers often attempt to create family alliances with the old elite, so as to co-opt at least part of it. Somoza García married into the powerful Debayle-Sacasa family; Batista divorced his first wife and married «up»; and Jean-Claude Duvalier chose his wife from the light-skinned Bennett family

27 3. Constitutional HypocrisySultanistic rulers does not necessarily occupy the position that is constitutionally the most powerful, a policy called politique de doublure, or «politics of understudy», in Haïti. The Somozas occasionally put a puppet in charge of the presidency; Trujillo left it to 4 different men, one of whom was his brother; Manuel Noriega in Panama continued the habit of his predecessor Omar Torrijos, of ruling as head of the military with a nominal president as head of state.

28 Presidents of Nicaragua (1937-79)Anastasio Somoza García ( ) Leonardo Argüello Barreto (1-26/5 1947) Benjamín Lacayo Sacasa (acting) (26/5-15/8 1947) Víctor Manuel Román y Reyes ( ) Anastasio Somoza García ( ) Luís Somoza Debayle ( ) René Schick ( ) Lorenzo Guerrero ( ) Anastasio Somoza Debayle ( ) Liberal-Conservative Junta ( ) Anastasio Somoza Debayle ( ) Francisco Urcuyo (acting) (17-18/7 1979)

29 Presidents of the Dominican Republic (1930-62)Rafael Trujillo ( ) Jacinto Peynado ( ) Manuel de Jesús Troncoso de la Concha ( ) Rafael Trujillo ( ) Héctor Trujillo ( ) Joaquín Balaguer ( )

30 Presidents of Panama (1968-89)José María Pinilla Fábrega and Bolívar Urrutia Parrilla ( ) Demetrio B. Lakas ( ) Aristides Royo ( ) Ricardo de la Espriella ( ) Jorge Illueca (1984) Nicolás Ardito Barletta Vallarino ( ) Eric Arturo Delvalle (acting) ( ) Manuel Solís Palma (acting) ( ) Francisco Rodríguez (provisional) (1/9-20/ )

31 4. The Narrow Social Bases of SultanismThe ability of sultanistic rulers to stay in power depends on their freedom from the need to forge alliances with civil society. This freedom increases if they can mobilize certain economic resources. In the end the social bases of a sultanistic regime are restricted to its family members, clients and cronies. It is often alleged that sultanistic leaders substitute superpower patronage for a domestic power base. The close association of most sultanistic leaders with the US of A is beyond doubt.

32 5. Distorted Capitalism Under the dominance of a patrimonial regime only certain types of capitalism are able to develop. The personalistic use of power for the essentially private ends of the ruler and his cronies means that the country is run like a huge domain. The boundaries between the public treasury and the private wealth of the ruler become blurred. He and his cronies, with his consent, freely appropriate public funds, establish profit-oriented monopolies, and demands gifts and payoffs from business for which no public accounting is given. Often the privileged are thus exploited, as landowners, merchants, and foreign capitalists buy their peace by making payments to the regime. Kleptocracy or mafia economics («guns, goons and gold»), not market economics.

33 Common factors in the emergence of sultanistic regimes in Latin America1. Macrostructural Factors: Socioeconomic Conditions, Crisis of Sovereignty 2. Political Factors: Breakdown of Clientelistic Democracy, Decay of Authoritarian Regimes 3. Leadership Factors: The Ruler’s Personality

34 1. Macrostructural factors: (1) Socioeconomic ConditionsSmall countries in the Caribbean and Central America: customs fees are an important source of funds Rentier states not bound by tradition are more vulnerable to sultanization: Sugarcane (Cuba, Dominican Republic); Oil (Venezuela)

35 1. Macrostructural factors: (2) Crisis of SovereigntyInfringements on the sovereignty of countries located in a strategically sensitive region marred by cronically unstable governments unable to pay their debts: Dominican Republic (Occupied by US marines ) Nicaragua (Occupied by US marines ; ) Cuba (Platt Amendment ( /40); Guantánamo Bay Naval Base) Panama (The Canal Zone ) Haiti (Occupied by US marines )

36 The link between foreign intervention and sultanismSultanistic tendencies arise when a foreign power seeks some control over a country but wants to retreat from direct occupation. The sultanistic ruler them becomes the guarantor of the external power’s interest. Therefore it is in some sense the very retreat of the foreign power that favours sultanism, since the foreign power leaves behind a partially modernized administrative and especially military apparatus that enables the ruler to concentrate power in his hands.

37 2. Political Institutional FactorsBreakdown of Clientelistic Democracy: Cuba had a constitutional government ( ) marred by clientelistic politics and widespread corruption Decay of Authoritarian Regimes: Haiti (Jean-Claude Duvalier); Panama (Manuel Noriega)

38 3. Leadership Factors: The Ruler’s PersonalityThe typical sultanistic ruler: limited education, comes from socially marginal backgrounds, shrewd but morally unscrupulous, distrustful and vindictive, and they show an amazing capacity to lie and womanize. In addition to their hedonism, they often betray a streak of cruelty. The founder is often more politically savvy than his son(s)

39 Characteristics of the demise of sultanistic regimes in Latin America1. The Difficulty of Political Liberalization 2. After sultanism: Bleak prospects for democracy

40 1. The Difficulty of Political LiberalizationIf the sultanistic ruler decides to liberalize his regime, the chances that this might lead to democracy are limited. Since the regime is extremely personalistic, the ruler himself is the target of the opposition: compromise between the regime and the opposition becomes downright impossible, since there is no neutral force to which both could appeal as an arbiter. There are no trusted moderates in the regime to negotiate with, since everybody is tainted by association with the ruler.

41 2. After sultanism: Bleak prospects for democracySultanistic regimes are therefore more vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow (Cuba 1959, Nicaragua 1979) or overthrow by military coup (Paraguay 1989). After the installation of a revolutionary government, prospects for democracy are bleak. The moderates in provisional governments are sooner or later pushed aside either by radicals (Cuba, Nicaragua) or by remnants of the old regime (Dominican Republic, Haiti). If overthrown, sultanistic regimes are more likely to be replaced by a revolutionary or another type of authoritarian regime than by a democracy.

42 2. After sultanism (cont.)The «loss» of American clients in revolutions that ousted sultanistic rulers has not been easily digested by the US government. Old habits die hard: US interventions: Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961, intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; US support for the contras in Nicaragua ; and in a different way, the invasion of Panama in 1989 after the local client (Noriega) was no longer acceptable.

43 Use approximately 1 hour to answer the following question:Define «presidentialism»/»presidential regime». How may presidentialism increase the risk of democratic breakdown? Define «presidential interruption» and provide an overview of empirical cases of «interrupted presidencies» in Third Wave Latin American democracies.

44 Presidential systems definedAn executive with considerable constitutional powers and generally with full control of the composition of his cabinet and administration is elected by the people (directly or indirectly by an electoral college elected for that purpose) for a fixed period of time and is not dependent on a formal vote of confidence by the democratically elected representatives in a parliament. The president is not only the holder of executive power but symbolically head of state and cannot be dismissed, except in rare cases of impeachment, between elections.

45 The «perils of presidentialism»Two features stand out in presidential systems: 1. Both the president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or an electoral college elected by the people for that sole purpose), and an elected legislature (unicameral or bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy. It is a system of «dual democratic legitimacy». 2. Both the president and the congress are elected for a fixed term, the president’s tenure in office is independent of the legislature, and the survival of the legislature is independent of the president. This leads to what is characterized as the «rigidity» of the presidential system.

46 The risks of democratic breakdownDual democratic legitimacy: since both the executive and the legislative are directly elected and thus both can claim direct popular legitimacy, this can create problems if the legislative majority represents a different political choice than that of the executive. Who is better legitimated to speak in the name of the people: the president or the congressional majority that opposes the policies of the president? There is no democratic principle to resolve this question. Such stalemated situations increase the danger of the military intervening as a «poder moderador».

47 The risks of democratic breakdownRigidity of fixed terms: Presidents are elected for fixed periods of time that under normal circumstances cannot be modified (shortened or prolonged). The political process becomes broken up into rigidly determined periods without the same possibility of continuous flexibility as in parliamentary systems. A prime minister can always reinforce his authority and democratic legitimacy by asking for a vote of confidence, or be replaced by a new prime minister who enjoys such confidence. Imepachment is mor difficult to use than a vote of confidence. The uncertainties of periods of regime transition and consolidation make the rigidities of presidentialism more problematic than a parliamentary system, which permits flexible responses to a changing situation

48 Arguments against presidentialism1. The «perils of presidentialism»: the consequences of political conflict in presidentialism are democratic breakdowns 2. Presidentialism encourages «winner-takes-all» outcomes 3. Presidentialism is prone to the election of amateur «outsiders» 4. A president who cannot be reelected is «unaccountable»

49 Presidential interruption defined«Presidential interruption» defined: «a premature, extraordinary and forced resignation of a democratically elected president that does not result in a democratic breakdown»

50 Cases of presidential interruptions since 1980Country Year 1. Hernán Siles Zuazo Bolivia 1985 2. Raúl Alfonsín Argentina 1989 3. Fernando Collor de Melo Brazil 1992 4. Carlos Andrés Pérez Venezuela 1993 5. Jorge Serrano Guatemala

51 Cases of presidential interruptions since 1980 (cont.)Country Year 6. Joaquín Balaguer The Dominican Republic 1994/1996 7. Abdalá Bucaram Ecuador 1997 8. Raúl Cubas Paraguay 1999 9. Jamil Mahuad 2000 10. Alberto Fujimori Peru

52 Cases of presidential interruptions since 1980 (cont.)Country Year 11. Fernando de la Rúa Argentina 2001 12. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Bolivia 2003 13. Lucio Gutiérrez Ecuador 2005 14. Carlos Mesa Manuel Zelaya Honduras 2009 Fernando Lugo Otto Pérez Molina Dilma Rousseff Paraguay Guatemala Brazil 2012 2015 2016

53 Use approximately 2 hours to answer the following question:Discuss different ways of defining populism as a concept. Describe the main characteristics of competitive auhoritarianism. Are populist regimes more prone to turn into competitive authoritarian regimes? Use empirical examples

54 Populism as a concept: Populism and NeopopulismDue to the strong inclusionary element in the historical cases of populism in the «classical» era ( ), some authors define populism in more substantive terms, emphasizing the economic and social content of populist policies and/or the meaning of populism for the relations among different classes in society. They do not see populism and neoliberalism as compatible, and hence do not consider neoliberal neopopulists (such as Menem and Fujimori) as «true» populists.

55 Populism and NeopopulismBut is populism tied or closely linked to specific socioeconomic policies or class bases of support, or can it emerge and prosper in a variety of socioeconomic settings? Weyland 2001, who defines populism in purely political terms (as a political strategy), claims that it can. Weyland therefore sees populism as compatible with neoliberalism and indentifies certain affinities between them.

56 Populism defined: Weyland 2003Weyland 2003 applies and follows Weyland (2001: 14)’s political definition of populism as: «a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers».

57 Populism defined: Jansen 2011Jansen 2011 also defines populism in political terms as a mode of political practice: Populist Mobilization Populist Mobilization=any sustained project combining popular mobilization with populist rhetoric. The term should be reserved for only those political projects in which the two are copresent and mutually reinforcing.

58 Populist Mobilization=Popular Mobilization+Populist RhetoricPopular mobilization is a subtype of political mobilization: the mobilization of marginalized social sectors into contentious political action. But to meet the standards of populist mobilization, popular mobilization must be infused with populist rhetoric. Populist rhetoric: anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that valorizes ordinary people.

59 Latin American Classical Populism and NeopopulismClassical Populists: Argentina’s Juan Domingo Perón ( ), Brazil’s Getúlio Vargas ( ; ), Mexico’s Lázaro Cárdenas ( ) Neoliberal Neopopulists: Peru’s Alberto Fujimori ( ), Argentina’s Carlos Menem ( ), Brazil’s Fernando Collor ( ), Ecuador’s Abdalá Bucaram ( ) Nonneoliberal Neopopulists: Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez ( ), Ecuador’s Rafael Correa ( ), Bolivia’s Evo Morales (2006-present)

60 Competitive Authoritarian RegimesCompetitive authoritarianism=Diminished form of authoritarianism Competitive authoritarian regime: Coexistence of democractic rules and autocratic methods (bribery, cooptation, «legal» persecution). The presence of elections, legislatures, courts, and independent media creates periodic opportunities for challenges by opposition forces. CA-regimes are more likely to occur where conditions were unfavourable to the consolidation of either democractic or authoritarian regimes.

61 Hybrid regimes Democracy Diminished subtypes of democracyDiminished subtypes of authoritarianism Authoritarian regime Illiberal democracy, Semidemocracy Competitive authoritarianism

62 Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the AndesLevitsky & Loxton 2013: populism as a catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Populism pushes weak democracies into CA-regimes for 3 reasons: 1. Populists are political outsiders who lack experience with institutions of repesentative democracy 2. Due to the anti-establishment nature of their appeal, successful populists believe to have received an electoral mandate to bury the existing elite and its institutions, and to «refound» the political system 3. Populist presidents usually face hostile institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by the established elite and their parties and thus have an incentive to assault existing institutions (close Congress, pack courts, rewrite the constitutions)

63 Populism defined: Levitsky & Loxton 2013Levitsky & Loxton 2013 define populism/populists in terms of 3 characteristics: 1. Populists mobilize mass support via anti-establishment appeals, in opposition to the entire elite 2. Populists are outsiders who rise to political prominence from social movements outside the national party system 3. Populists establish a personalistic linkage to voters, circumventing parties and other forms of institutional mediation

64 Populist prototype and subtypes of populismCases of populism that combine all 3 of these characteristics are labeled as cases of «full populism». Nevertheless, populism may be viewed as a semi-radial category. The anti-establishment appeal is the sine qua non of populism, but cases that combine such an appeal with one, but not both, of the other characteristics may by considered as diminished subtypes of populism: «maverick populism», «movement populism»

65 Prototype and subtypes of populismAnti-establishment appeal Emergence from social movements Personalistic linkage to voters Full-blown populists X Movement populists Maverick populists

66 Populism and competitive authoritarian regimesThe relationship between populism and competitive authoritarianism should be strongest in cases of full-blown populism Levitsky & Loxton 2013 study 14 governments in 4 Andean countries (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela) between 1990 and 2010.

67 The 7 populist cases 4 cases of full-blown populists: Fujimori in Peru, Chávez in Venezuela, Gutiérrez and Correa in Ecuador 1 case of a movement populist: Morales in Bolivia 2 cases of maverick populists: Caldera in Venezuela and Bucaram in Ecuador

68 The 5 cases of CA-regimes1. Peru under Fujimori ( ) 2. Venezuela under Chávez ( ) 3. Ecuador under Gutiérrez ( ) 4. Ecuador under Correa ( ) 5. Bolivia under Morales (2006-present)